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1. INTRODUCTION 
EU leaders are well aware of the relevance of migration in the European policy agenda.  
Thirty-two pages out of forty-eight of the Presidency Conclusions at the November 2004 
European Council were devoted to migration policies.   Economic theory suggests that there 
is a strong case for policy co-ordination in this field: relevant spillovers across national 
jurisdictions, economies of scale and potential free-riding in the enforcement of border 
controls.  However, no delegation of authority to supra-national bodies is envisaged in the 
Presidency Conclusions in the field of restrictions to legal migration.  While Qualified 
Majority Voting is now accepted on measures tackling illegal migration, decisions on 
restrictions to legal migration are envisaged only under unanimity rules. 
 
Un-coordinated national policies are getting increasingly tough on migrants.  Border 
controls are tightened or welfare access is prevented to foreigners or both doors, work and 
social assistance, are closed.   This does not seem to prevent migration to occur.  It distorts 
its geographical orientation, modifies its skill composition and inflates the ranks of the 
informal sector.  Illegal migration is larger when restrictions to legal migration are tight.  
Illegal flows as a proportion of the population are about one fourth larger in Europe than in 
the US; at the same time, legal flows are 25% larger in the US than in Europe.  And the US 
has more realistic migration restrictions than most European countries.   
 
Countries are getting tougher also because they fail to co-ordinate.  The implications of the 
failure of policy co-ordination in terms of national restrictions came out very clearly with 
the Eastern Enlargement.  There was a “race to the top” of migration restrictions with 12 out 
of the 15 Member States of the European Union (EU) reneging on their previous 
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commitment not to restrict worker flows from the New Members.  And the few EU-15 
countries that ultimately opened their labour markets for workers from the New Member 
States at least partially restricted instead access to welfare by migrants. Lack of co-
ordination raises concerns among public opinion that migration flows could be diverted to 
the most liberal countries, increasing pressures on their welfare systems.  Diversion of 
migration flows is, by itself, undesirable on economic grounds.  It means that migration 
cannot fully play a spatial arbitrage function, “greasing the wheels” of otherwise immobile 
labour markets.  
 
Thus, national Governments seem to be caught into a vicious circle: they top-up migration 
restrictions enforced by other countries ending up for the most to increase illegal migration, 
which itself raises concerns among public opinion inducing a tough stance towards 
migrants.   
 
Why is it so difficult to co-ordinate migration policies at the EU level?  Is it because of free-
riding?  Who gains and who loses from uncoordinated migration restrictions?  How much 
do they distort East-West migration both in terms of the geographical orientation of worker 
flows and the skill composition of migration?  It may well be that the countries not located 
at the borders of the Union and hence receiving less migrants prefer to enjoy the benefits of 
stronger growth elsewhere in the Union without having to bear the assimilation and fiscal 
costs of immigration.  Another explanation is that for non-economic reasons (e.g., historical 
and cultural factors) citizens of different EU countries have different views about migration 
and hence oppose any policy co-ordination at the EU level. Else it is national politicians 
who prefer to keep under their jurisdictions migration policies as they target a convenient 
political scapegoat, namely the non-voting immigrant.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on these issues, by drawing on lessons from 
the Eastern Enlargement episode, using preliminary evidence on migration to countries with 
different types of restrictions, predictions from a computable general equilibrium model as 
well as public opinion polls.  
 
The plan is as follows.  At first, in Section 1, we succinctly review recent evolutions of 
migration restrictions in the EU-15 and the “race to the top” occurred in the eve of the 
Eastern Enlargement. Moreover, we analyse whether and to what extent the transitional 
arrangements result in the diversion and reduction of East-West migration flows. For this 
purpose, we compare estimates of the migration potential with recent migration patterns 
observed after May 1, 2004. Next, in Section 2, we evaluate, based on a stylised general 
equilibrium model, not only the costs for the EU of having un-coordinated migration 
policies, but also potential explanations of the failure to co-ordinate policies. Although the 
potential income gains from East-West migration exceed those from the further integration 
of goods and capital markets, the uneven distribution of gains and losses across receiving 
and sending countries can create incentives for closing-the-door policies and for free-riding 
on liberal policies of other countries. Moreover, we analyse whether welfare benefits 
increase income in the region by facilitating further migration and whether the distribution 
of welfare benefits generates itself incentives for co-ordination failures. In Section 3, we 
turn to perceptions as to the costs and benefits of migration in general and from the East in 
particular, as revealed by public opinion polls in the West.  We look at whether or not they 
point to a divergence of preferences on these issues and what are the determinants of cross-
country difference in the degree of acceptance of migrants in relation with economic as well 
as non-economic factors.  Finally, in Section 4 we summarise our results and draw 
implications as to ways to overcome resistance of some governments to co-ordinate policies. 






2. RECENT EVOLUTIONS IN NATIONAL IMMIGRATION POLICIES 
2.1.    The tightening of immigration restrictions  
International migration is the "great absentee"  in the era of globalisation. While the barriers 
to international trade and capital mobility have already been largely removed, labour 
markets are the most tightly regulated area of economic activity (Faini et. al., 1999). 
Governments regulate, among other things, the maximum number of work permits to be 
granted within a given period of time (usually a year), the criteria to be followed in ranking 
applications for visas (e.g., skills, linguistic capabilities, nationality, family links), the 
duration of the work permits, the procedures to be followed in the renewal of visas, the 
number of years required before obtaining a permanent residence permit, the type of 
residence permits allowed (e.g., temporary vs. permanent), the nature and number of 
certificates and guarantees required for the admission in the host country, the type and 
number of administrations involved in the processing of applications, and the procedures to 
be followed in case of family reunification.  Not less regulated is asylum seeking migration, 
which often respond also to economic factors.  Regulations are also frequently revised, 
which increases the uncertainty associated with the decision to migrate.  This may have 
perverse effects on the timing of migration – as there is an option value in migrating before 
borders are closed – but certainly increases its costs.  
 
Within the European Union (EU) matters are, at least in principle, different. Since the Rome 
Treaty, which established the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, the free 
mobility of labour has been acknowledged as one of the four fundamental freedoms of the 
Common Market. Free movement started in a community of six countries with a joint 
population of 185 million people, and has been extended step-by-step to the 15 members of 
the 'old' EU and the three other members of the European Economic Association (EEA) with 
a joint population of 380 million people. Although many barriers to intra-EU mobility of EU 
citizens remain (e.g., in terms of portability of private pension rights, legal recognition of 
professions, information about job opportunities, etc.), the free mobility of labour, including 
the equal treatment with regard to welfare benefits, is in principle guaranteed by the 
supranational legislation of the EU. 
 
Legal immigration into the EU from third countries is instead regulated at the national level 
and the recent evolution of these national migration policies in the EU involved tighter and 
tighter restrictions. Since 1996 there have been 35 reforms in this field, that is, almost 4 
reforms per year. Most of these reforms (80%) are marginal in that they adjust specific 
provisions rather than revising the overall regulatory framework.  Furthermore, 7 reforms 
out of 10 tighten regulations, e.g., by increasing procedural obstacles faced by those 
applying for visas, reducing the duration of work permits or making family reunification 
more difficult.  The trend in migration policies can also be characterised in terms of indexes 
for the main policy areas.  Figure 2.1. draws on immigration policy indexes developed at 
Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti (see www.frdb.org for details) and an index of restrictions 
in asylum policies defined by Hatton (2004).  Larger values of the indexes denote tighter 
regulations.  As shown by Figure 2.1., it is mainly requirements to be fulfilled for being MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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granted an entry visa and national quotas which are getting tighter.  Some relaxation is 
occurring in terms of years required to obtain citizenship and assimilation policies are 
sometimes being strengthened, but entry is becoming more and more difficult. 
 
Importantly, countries tightening regulations are often those which had the most restrictive 
provisions to start with.  This is the visual impression given by Figure 2.2., plotting the 
value of the aggregate policy index obtained by taking the average of the six indicators 
displayed in Figure 2.1. in the initial and final year for which observations are available.  
Not only are most countries above the bisecting line through the origin, denoting a 
tightening of regulations, but also it is the countries which initially had the most liberal 
policies (perhaps because they were historically emigration countries) which have 
liberalised flows.   
 








1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Admission requirements Length of first stay
Staying requirements Years to obtain a permanent residence permit





There is also evidence that reforms are exerting spillover effects across jurisdictions.  For 
instance, Finland tightened up its regulations in 2004, following closely the most restrictive 
stance taken by Denmark in 2002.  Portugal adopted more restrictive provisions in 2001, 
just after a likewise restrictive reform implemented by Spain in 2000.  And Ireland chose a 
more restrictive approach in 1999, after two reforms in the UK, which tightened up 
migration restrictions, respectively in 1996 and 1998. Moreover, individual countries closely 
monitor developments in other countries.  In the website of the British Home Office one can 
find several reports reviewing the evolution of migration policies in the other EU Members.  
Recently Denmark and the Netherlands protested against the large regularisation process in 
Spain, arguing that it could have pushed more illegal migrants into the EU. In the public 
debate, reference is often made to changes in migration policies occurred in other countries.  
The provocative proposal of the leader of the Italian Northern League, Umberto Bossi, to MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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build-up a wall at the border of Italy with Slovenia was based on the fact that Austria was 
closing border towards migrants from the New Members states.  And the current Danish 
Prime Minister has been actively campaigning on migration referring to policies carried out 
in Germany, UK and Sweden. 
 
Policy spillovers are present also in the case of Asylum Policies, where a rush to the top 
occurred towards the end of the 1980s after the initial decision of Germany and, later, the 
UK to tighten asylum legislation (Hatton, 2004).  In the case of policies for immigrations of 
highly skilled migrants, spillover are instead occurring in the other direction (OECD, 2001), 
with a race in trying to attract more highly skilled migrants.  For instance, the decision of 
France in 2004 to introduce tax deductions for highly skilled migrants was explicitly 
motivated by the fact that Belgium had adopted policies encouraging inflows of highly 
skilled workers.  Similarly., the British ad hoc scheme for highly skilled migrants was 
motivated referring to the measures being taken in Germany.  
 
Figure 2.2. Convergence in immigration policies? 
 
 
Spillovers in migration policies were also evident in the way in which the EU-15 adjusted 
their regulations on work permits in the eve of the Eastern Enlargement, exploiting the 
transitional arrangements allowed for by the accession treaties.  This event is discussed 
below.   
2.2. Eastern Enlargement and the “Race-to-the-Top” 
Fifteen years ago, the ‘iron curtain’ was lifted for a region of approximately 400 million 




2 joined the EU on the 1
st of May, 2004. Another two countries, Bulgaria and 
Romania, are expected to accede in 2006 or 2007. The joint population of the eight New 
Member States (NMS) from Central and Eastern Europe amounted to 72 millions in 2004, 
the population of the two other accession candidates number some 30 millions. The 
accession treaties contain transitional arrangements for the free labour mobility, which allow 
to postpone the opening of labour markets up to a maximum period of seven years.
3 These 
transitional provisions can only be adopted sequentially: at first, in the two years following 
accession, all Member States can apply national rules on access to their labour markets; at 
the end of this two-year period, each Member State can choose to apply national rules for 
another three years or implement the Community rules regulating free labour mobility in the 
EU. If the countries decide to apply the Community rules, they maintain a safeguard clause 
meaning that they can reintroduce work permits temporarily. There will be an automatic 
review before the end of the two-year period and a further review on request of each 
affected Member State, but the decision on the application of transitional periods is left to 
the national Governments. At the end of the five year period, Community rules should be 
introduced under normal circumstances, but the transitional periods can be prolonged for 
another two years if the Member State can document that it experiences (or is “threatened” 
by) ‘serious disturbances’ in its labour market. Again, the decision on the prolongation of 
the transitional periods is left to national Governments.  
 
Transitional periods for the free mobility of labour have been agreed also in other 
Enlargement rounds: in case of the accession of Greece a six-year transitional period was 
agreed, and, at the accession of Portugal and Spain, a seven-year transitional period was 
introduced, later on reduced to six years. However, what makes the present rules different 
from those adopted in previous Enlargement rounds is that individual countries are let free 
to decide on whether or not adopting the transitional arrangements. Delegating the decision 
on transitional periods to the national level had important consequences: seven out of fifteen 
Member States of the EU, among them Austria and Germany, who attract about two-thirds 
of the migrants from the accession countries at present, declared from the beginning that 
they planned to leave relatively tight restrictions to the immigration of labour in place at 
least for the first two years after Enlargement.
4  Governments of another five countries – 
Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK – stated instead that they planned 
not to restrict the access to their labour market at that time, while the remaining countries 
(Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) remained undecided although the relevant Ministers 
publicly stated that they were in favour of free mobility of workers from the NMS. The 
Governments in three out of the five countries which had formally stated their intention to 
open-up their labour market reneged on this commitment and all adopted transitional 
restrictions vis-à-vis workers from the NMS.   
 
In particular, in Denmark, the government agreed with the opposition to concede a work 
permit only to those individuals from the new Member States who can prove that they have 
a job which meets regular standards with regard to wage and working conditions.  If a 
migrant looses her job, residence permits are withdrawn (Danish Minister of Employment, 
2004). The Netherlands reversed the decision of the Kok II Government to open up the 
labour market completely and introduced instead a quota of 22,000 employees until May 
2006. If the quota is not filled, the removal of the transitional arrangement can be considered 
(Kvist, 2004). Welfare access was also closed to migrants.  In Sweden, the minority 
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government proposed to issue residence and work permits only for those workers from the 
NMS who could prove that they had jobs meeting certain requirement with respect to 
national wage agreements and excluded individuals from the CEECs from several welfare 
benefits. However, the proposal of the Swedish government was overruled in Parliament, 
and Sweden is currently the only country where Community rules for labour mobility apply 
at present.  The United Kingdom and Ireland decided to open-up their labour markets in 
principle to individuals from the new Member States, but they left also certain restrictions in 
place. Work permits are only issued for one year, and if migrants lose their jobs, the resident 
permits can be withdrawn. Again, the access to welfare benefits remains restricted (Home 
Office, 2004a). This is a substantial change compared to the initial announcement of the 
British Government to open labour markets immediately after accession. 
 
Finally, the three “undecided” countries -- Italy, Portugal and Spain – opted for restrictive 
provisions.  Italy, in particular introduced a quota of 20,000 work permits for workers from 
the NMS, well below the projected immigration flows to this country (Alvarez-Plata et al., 
2003) while Greece, Spain and Portugal decided to leave their immigration restrictions in 




Transitional regulations in the EU-15 
  Access to labour market  Access to welfare benefits 
Austria  Access to labour markets restricted at least for 2 years,  Restricted. 
  quotas for work permits.   
Belgium  Access to labour markets restricted at least for 2 years.  Restricted. 
Denmark General  access to labour market, but obligations for  Restricted, residence and  
  work and residence permits. Work permits issued only  work permits can be withdrawn  
  for 1 year (EU-nationals: 5 years).  in case of unemployment. 
Finland  Access to labour markets restricted at least for 2 years.   
France  Access to labour markets restricted at least for 2 years.  Restricted. 
Germany  Access to labour markets restricted at least for 2 years,  Restricted. 
  prolongation for further 3 years under discussion.   
Greece  Access to labour markets restricted at least for 2 years.   
Ireland General  access to labour market, but obligation to   Restricted, income support etc.  
  register for work and residence permits. Work permits  is granted only to individuals  
  issued first for limited time. Safeguard clause applies.  which  have a right for a  
   residence  permit. 
 Italy  Access to labour markets restricted at least for 2 years,  Restricted. 
  quotas for work permits.   
Luxembourg  Access to labour markets restricted at least for 2 years.  Restricted. 
Portugal  Access to labour markets restricted at least for 2 years,  Restricted. 
  quotas for work permits.   
Spain  Access to labour markets restricted at least for 2 years,  Restricted. 
  bilateral agreement with Poland which permits limited    
  number of Polish nationals to work.   
Sweden  Community rule for free labour mobility applies.  Equal treatment. 
United  General access to labour market, but obligation to   Restricted, income support etc.  
Kingdom  register for work and residence permits. Work permits  is granted only to individuals  
  issued first for limited time. Safeguard clause applies.  which have a right for a  MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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   residence  permit. 
Sources: Collection by the authors, based on Home Office (2004); Kvist (2004) and national 
information. 
 
Altogether, we observed a race to the top in immigration restrictions vis-à-vis workers from 
the NMS.  The final outcome was likely worse than had the restrictions being agreed at the 
EU-level.  It was certainly more restrictive than in the case of the previous enlargement 
rounds, although income differences are in this case unprecedented (Boeri and Brücker, 
2001).  It is likely that the initial decision of the two largest immigration countries – Austria 
and Germany – to restrict migration from the new Member States fuelled fears that 
migration flows could be diverted into smaller countries, raising concerns about migration 
pressures there. Moreover, decisions to apply transitional periods in individual Member 
States have been carefully reviewed by other Member States and affected decisions 
elsewhere. For instance, the decision in the Netherlands to reverse the initial decision of the 
Kok II Government influenced the decisions of the Swedish government (Kvist, 2004) to 
renege on its previous commitments. Similarly, the Dutch Government is presently 
proposing to extend the transitional period for another two years and a key argument being 
used before the Parliament is that Germany is going to do the same.  Significant press 
coverage of decisions made in neighbouring countries was provided in these countries.   
 
The race to the top ended with four different transitional regimes: first, a restrictive 
immigration regime, which provides nationals from the new Member States no further rights 
than citizens to non-EEA countries. This implies that work permits are only issued in 
exceptional circumstances when it can be proved that neither natives nor other EU-nationals 
can fill the position. The main channel of entry is in these countries family reunification. 
This regime applies to Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, France, Luxembourg and Spain. 
The second regime adopts basically the same rules than the first one, but it opens the labour 
market beyond that by a quota for nationals from the new Member States (Austria, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal). Third, we have a number of countries which admit generally the 
access of nationals from the new Member States to their labour markets, but work and 
residence permits are only issued if certain requirements with regard to tariff wages, 
working conditions etc. are met. Moreover, the access to welfare benefits is limited and 
residence permits can be withdrawn in case of unemployment (Denmark, Ireland, UK). 
Finally, we have one country, Sweden, where due to the failure of the government to find a 
majority in Parliament, the rules of the Community for the free movement of labour apply 
(Table 2.1.). 
2.3. The consequences of the “race-to-the top”: migration reduction  
       and migration diversion 
 
When the Berlin Wall broke down in 1989, many observers expected a mass migration wave 
from the East to the West. Indeed, the income gap between the East and the West in Europe 
is substantial. The per capita GDP of the new Member States amounts in purchasing power 
parities to 49 per cent of incomes in the EU-15 (Eurostat, 2003), and in the neighbouring 
Commonwealth of Independent States to around one-fifth of the EU-15 level (Figure 2.3). 
At current exchange rates, the income gap is even larger. Nevertheless, with few exceptions, 
i.e. the cases of Albania and Eastern Germany, the removal of emigration barriers for the 
people in the former Eastern Bloc caused only moderate migration so far: cumulative net 
emigration since 1989 from the eight NMS and the two other accession candidates from 
Central and Eastern Europe to the EU can be estimated at around 1,1 million people, which MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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equals one per cent of their population. No doubt, these moderate migration flows reflect 
also tight immigration restrictions in Western Europe. But also suggest that migration 
pressures are not as strong as to bypass national restrictions. 
 
The transitional arrangements for immigration from the new Member States which we 
observe in the EU since the 1
st of May, 2004, affect the allocation of migration flows and 
stocks. They have two effects: on the one hand, they divert migration flows away from the 
countries which have decided to pursue restrictive immigration policies during the 
transitional periods to those which decided to open their labour markets, at least partially. 
On the other hand, transitional arrangements reduce migration stocks and flows relative to 
the scenario with free labour mobility, since the cost of migration increase with the distance 
from the country that would have been chosen otherwise. Distance is meant here to be a 
measure which captures not only geographical distance, but also the cultural, linguistic and 





The income gap in Europe, 2002 
 
 
Table 2.2 displays the number of migrants from the CEEC-10 in the EU-15. It clearly 
documents that geographical distance is a key factor explaining the allocation of migrants 
from the CEEC-10 across the old EU Member States: the countries bordering the CEECs, 
i.e. Austria, Germany, Greece and Italy, absorbed more than 80 per cent of the migrants 
from the accession countries before the Enlargement. The share of migrants from the CEEC-
10 in the population of these countries varies -- with the exception of Italy, which shares 
only a small border with Slovenia – between 0.7 and 1.0 per cent, while it is only 0.3 per 
cent at the average of the EU-15.  This regional migration pattern has been rather stable 
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during the 1990s and early 2000s, although the share of CEEC-10 migrants going to 
Germany has slightly declined in the wake of the economic stagnation in the recent years. 
 
Note that all these countries attracting significant flows from the CEEC-10 imposed tight 
restrictions for immigration from the new Member States during the transitional periods. 
Among the ‘Big-Four’ in the old EU only the UK decided to open its labour market 
partially. It is too early to assess empirically whether and to what extent the transitional 
arrangements actually reduced migration flows and diverted migration away from the 
traditional destinations of migrants from NMS. We provide below just some first scattered 
evidence. Before doing that, in Section 2.3.1 we provide the counter-factual, i.e. a projection 
of the migration potential under the hypothetical assumption of free labour mobility for all 
countries in the enlarged EU. Then, in Section 2.3.2 we will present reported migration 




Regional break-down of migrants from the CEEC-10 across the EU-15 
as a percentage
year  of population
Austria 2001 78,886 1.0 7.3
Belgium 2001 13,208 0.1 1.2
Denmark 2004 11,596 0.2 1.1
Finland 2001 13,639 0.3 1.3
France 1999 51,942 0.1 4.8
Germany 2003 614,094 0.7 57.0
Greece 2001 71,742 0.7 6.7
Ireland
1) 2002 12,235 0.4 1.1
Italy
2) 2001 102,105 0.2 9.5
Luxembourg 2001 1,547 0.3 0.1
Netherlands 2004 17,538 0.1 1.6
Portugal 2001 963 0.0 0.1
Spain
3) 2003 17,104 0.0 1.6
Sweden 2003 24,295 0.3 2.3
UK 2001 45,858 0.1 4.3
EU-15 1,076,752 0.3 100.0
1) Only Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.- 2) Only Poland and Romania.- 3) Only
Bulagria and Poland.








2.3.1. Looking for the counter-factual: East-West migration under free movement 
A number of studies tried to estimate the long-run migration potential from the CEECs. 
Although most of these studies estimate the long-run migration potential from the Central 
and Eastern European countries in the EU-15 at between 3 and 4 per cent (e.g. Layard et al., 
1992; Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999; Boeri and Brücker, 2001; Alvarez-Plata et al., 2003; 
Krieger et al., 2003), there exist also studies which obtain significantly lower (Fertig, 2001; MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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Fertig and Schmidt, 2001; Dustmann et al., 2003) or higher estimates (Sinn et al., 2001, 
Flaig, 2001). The difference between the estimates can be largely traced back to different 
econometric estimation procedures. The methodological problems associated with estimates 
of the migration potential from the CEECs are discussed in some detail in Box 1. MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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Box 1  Methodological problems in estimating migration potentials 
 
Starting with the seminal contribution of Layard et al. (1992), numerous studies have tried 
to estimate East-West migration potential. Basically we can distinguish three main 
approaches in the literature: representative surveys, extrapolations from South-North to 
East-West migration, and forecasts based on econometric estimates of macro-migration 
models. Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages.  
 
Representative surveys allow deep insights into migration intentions and the human capital 
characteristics of potential migrants (see Fassmann and Hintermann, 1996; IOM, 1999, 
Krieger et al., 2003). However, there are three problems which make it almost impossible to 
derive quantitative forecasts of the migration potential from them: first, we do not know 
how serious migration intentions revealed in surveys are, i.e. whether migration intentions 
result in actual movements. Second, surveys capture only the supply side and ignore demand 
side factors such as job opportunities and the availability of housing. Third, surveys cannot 
mirror the temporary dimension of migration appropriately: since only few migrants stay 
permanently abroad, a large number of individuals which migrate once in their lifetime can 
coincide with a small fraction of the population which stays at a certain point of time 
abroad. Most careful surveys of migration intentions make therefore adjustments, which 
scale down migration intentions of 10 per cent of the population or more to an actual 
estimate of the migration potential of between 2 and 4 per cent of the population (see e.g. 
Krieger et al., 2003). 
 
Another strand of the literature extrapolated the number of South-North migrants in the 
1960s and early 1970s to East-West migration (Layard et al. 1992; Bauer and Zimmermann, 
1999). Note that the income gap between the Southern and the Northern European countries 
in the 1960s was similar to the gap between the EU-15 and the accession countries today 
(Maddison, 1995). In general, these extrapolation studies find a long-run migration potential 
of around 3 per cent of the population. However, in stark contrast to the conditions for 
South-North migration in the early 1960s and 1970s, the conditions for East-West migration 
today are affected by imbalances in both the labour markets of the receiving and sending 
countries, incomplete recovery from the transition shock, and close geographical proximity. 
Thus, extrapolation studies can provide no more than a hint at plausible orders of 
magnitude. 
 
The majority of the forecasts of East-West migration are based on econometric estimates of 
macro migration models, which explain migration flows or migration stocks by economic 
variables such as the income differential, (un-)employment rates in the sending and 
receiving countries, and some institutional variables. Although most studies employ the 
same set of explanatory variables, the estimates of the parameters, and, hence, of migration 
potentials differ considerably in the literature. The main problem of the econometric 
estimates can be traced back to the fact that they have to transfer parameter values which are 
estimated in another historical context and in another country sample are used for 
projections in the Central and Eastern European countries (Alecke et al., 2001; Fertig and 
Schmidt, 2001; Dustmann et al., 2003). The Central and Eastern European countries cannot 
be included in the original sample, since the iron curtain prevented effectively emigration. 
Thus, the projections rely implicitly on the assumption that the estimated parameter values 
remain constant not only across time, but also across space. Unfortunately, migration 
behaviour differs largely across countries due to differences in geography, language, culture, 
etc. This affects both the estimates of the intercept terms – which capture all factors which 
have a time-invariant impact on migration – and the slope parameters.  MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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There exist a number of alternative econometric models which impose different restrictions 
on the intercept, the slope parameters and the error terms. As an example, pooled OLS 
models, which are widely applied in the empirical literature, assume that both the intercept 
and the slope parameters are homogenous across countries, while fixed effects estimators 
allow for different intercepts, but assume that the slope parameters are homogeneous. 
Finally, there exist a number of heterogeneous estimators, which allow also the slope 
parameters to differ across countries and use for forecasts averages of the estimated 
parameters. Each estimation procedure has its trade-offs; the choice of the adequate 
estimation procedure is largely an empirical question.  
 
A large number of different estimation procedures have been tested on their out-of-sample 
forecasting performance in the context of international migration (Alvarez-Plata et al., 2003; 
Brücker and Siliverstovs, 2004). The key results of these studies are that (i) fixed effects 
estimators, which allow for country-specific intercepts, but assume that the slope parameters 
are constant across countries, outperform all other estimators, (ii) the forecasting errors of 
pooled OLS models, which assume that both the intercept and slope parameters are 
homogenous across countries, are around twice as high as those of fixed-effects models, and 
(iii) that heterogeneous estimators which allow both the intercept and the slope parameters 
to differ across countries are clearly outperformed by standard panel estimators. Thus, we 
chose for the estimation of the migration potential here a standard fixed effects estimator. 
However, the reader should keep in mind that any migration forecast for the Central and 
Eastern European countries relies on a number of arbitrary assumptions, in particular the 
assumption that we can transfer the parameter values obtained from another country sample 
to the Central and Eastern European countries. All forecasts are therefore subject to a good 
deal of uncertainty and should be interpreted carefully. 
 
The migration forecast is based here on the estimation of a macro model for the migration to 
Germany from a panel of European source countries for the period 1967-2001 (see 
Appendix A). Germany has been chosen because it is the main destination for migrants from 
the CEECs, and it reports stocks and flows of migrants at relatively long series, unlike many 
other EU countries.   
 
Table 2.3 
Germany: potential migration from the accession countries, 2004-2030 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
CEEC-10  225 453  258 201  239 719  203 173  163 623  127 916  98 420  29 379  16 195  12 716  10 449
CEEC-8  155 561  169 031  155 228  132 003  107 644  85 798  67 691  23 551  13 284  9 750  7 197
CEEC-2  69 892  89 171  84 491  71 169  55 979  42 118  30 729  5 828  2 911  2 965  3 252
CEEC-10  824 202 1 082 404 1 322 123 1 525 295 1 688 918 1 816 834 1 915 254 2 158 985 2 257 596 2 327 059 2 383 958
CEEC-8  628 065  797 096  952 324 1 084 327 1 191 971 1 277 768 1 345 459 1 527 200 1 608 334 1 663 647 1 704 652
CEEC-2  196 137  285 308  369 799  440 968  496 947  539 066  569 795  631 785  649 262  663 412  679 306
CEEC-10: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. - CEEC-8: CEEC-10





The projections of the migration potential in Table 2.3 are based on the assumption that the 
GDP per capita between the new Member States and the EU-15 converges at a rate of 2 per 
cent p.a. This speed of convergence is consistent with a number of studies for the EU and 
other European market economies (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991; 1995). It implies that 
halving the initial gap in per capita income levels will take 35 years. Growth rates in the 
new Member States since the end of the transitional recession fit pretty well into this MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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projection, although the growth experience differs from country to country. Unemployment 
rates are hard to predict. We assume therefore that unemployment rates remain constant 
during the projection period at a level which is equal to the average rate in the respective 
countries during the last five years.  This is consistent with the observation of jobless growth 
in the CEEC-10 (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2005).  
 
The projection for Germany is displayed in Table 2.3. The scenario predicts under the 
hypothetical assumption of a removal of the migration barriers in 2004 a net migration of 
156,000 persons to Germany from the eight new Member States (CEEC-8) and of 225,000 
persons for all ten accession countries (CEEC-10). Net migration achieves its peak one year 
later involving around 170,000 and 260,000 persons from the CEEC-8 and the CEEC-10, 
respectively, and then declines to attain six years later about one-third of this level. The 
long-run migration stock is attained 25 years after the introduction of the free movement at a 
foreign population of 1.7 and 2.4 million persons from the CEEC-8 and the CEEC-10, 
respectively. The simulation results also demonstrate that transitional arrangements have no 
impact on the long-run migration potential, since the convergence of per capita income 
levels is relatively slow (not displayed here). Of course, all these results rely on a number of 





EU-15: potential migration from the eight NMS, 2004-2030 
2004 2005 2010 2020 2030 2004 2005 2010 2020 2030
Austria 19,983 21,714 8,696 1,706 924 80,681 102,394 172,837 206,605 218,978
Belgium 3,346 3,636 1,456 286 155 13,508 17,144 28,938 34,592 36,664
Denmark 2,937 3,192 1,278 251 136 11,860 15,052 25,406 30,370 32,189
Finland 3,455 3,754 1,503 295 160 13,949 17,703 29,883 35,721 37,860
France 13,158 14,297 5,726 1,124 609 53,124 67,421 113,803 136,038 144,185
Germany 155,561 169,031 67,691 13,284 7,197 628,065 797,096 1,345,459 1,608,334 1,704,652
Greece 18,174 19,747 7,908 1,552 841 73,374 93,121 157,184 187,895 199,147
Ireland 3,099 3,368 1,349 265 143 12,513 15,881 26,806 32,044 33,963
Italy 25,865 28,105 11,255 2,209 1,197 104,428 132,533 223,709 267,417 283,431
Luxembourg 392 426 171 33 18 1,582 2,008 3,389 4,052 4,294
Netherlands 4,443 4,827 1,933 379 206 17,937 22,764 38,425 45,933 48,683
Portugal 244 265 106 21 11 985 1,250 2,110 2,522 2,673
Spain 4,333 4,708 1,885 370 200 17,493 22,201 37,474 44,796 47,479
Sweden 6,154 6,687 2,678 526 285 24,848 31,535 53,230 63,629 67,440
UK 11,617 12,623 5,055 992 537 46,901 59,524 100,473 120,104 127,296
EU-15 272,761 296,378 118,689 23,292 12,619 1,101,249 1,397,627 2,359,127 2,820,052 2,988,936
Sources: Authors' calculations. See text for assumptions of projection and extrapolation.
persons
net migration  foreign population
 
 
What are the implications of these projections for the other EU-15 countries? Although 
time-series does not exist for all EU-15 countries, available data suggest that the regional 
distribution of migrants across the EU-15 was relatively stable during the 1990s and early 
2000s. This can, inter alia, be traced back to network effects, which reinforce regional 
migration patterns once they have been established.  Under the strong assumption that the 
regional distribution of migrants across the EU displayed in Table 2.2 remains constant over 
time, we can extrapolate the German results to remaining EU countries. This has been done 
in Table 2.5. Assuming then that all EU-15 introduce free movement in 2004, we would get 
an initial net migration of 270,000 persons from the eight NMS in 2004, and of around 
300,000 persons one year later.  The long-run migration potential is achieved at around 3.0 
million persons roughly 30 years later. Note that projections which are based on MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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econometric estimates for other countries yield similar results: For instance, Dustmann et al. 
(2003) estimated in a study for the Home Office the initial net migration for the United 
Kingdom at between 4,900 and 12,600 persons p.a., which is in the range of our projections 
(11,600 persons).  
2.3.2. Is there migration diversion after Enlargement? 
At present, there is limited information on migration trends since the 1
st of May, 2004. 
Available evidence suggests that the transitional arrangements resulted in both, the 
diversion and the reduction of migration flows relative to the case of free labour mobility. 
First, the Home Office in the United Kingdom reports that more that 130,000 nationals from 
the new Member States have registered for work between May and December 2004, of 
which 40 per cent have been already in the UK prior to Enlargement (Home Office, 2004b). 
If these figures imply that 80,000 persons from the eight new Member States migrated to the 
UK in 2004, this would be more than five times the migration potential of the projections 
provided in Section 2.3.1.  However, the figures published by the Home Office cover also 
temporary migrants like seasonal workers, and not all individuals who register do later 
actually take-up jobs, so that actual immigration might be lower. Yet, given that the official 
number of nationals from the CEECs has been below 50,000 persons at the beginning of the 
1990s, the figures published by the UK Home Office point to a substantial increase in 
immigration. 
 
For Ireland, a country which pursues the same immigration policies as the UK during the 
transitional period, we have contradictory information. On the one hand, 7,500 work permits 
were issued to nationals from the NMS from January 1 to October 31, 2004, down from 
20,000 in the 12 months from January 1 and December 31 in 2003. On the other hand, the 
Irish government reports that 31,000 personal public service numbers (certificates which are 
necessary for a work permit
6) were issued to nationals from the NMS in the five months 
from May 1
st to October 31
st , 2004,  pointing to a substantial increase in the flows from 
CEECs relative to 2003. Thus, it is possible that migration flows into Ireland have been 
several times higher than predicted in the counterfactual scenario. 
 
Some diversion of migration flows from CEECs was also observed in the Nordic countries.  
In Sweden, the only EU country without transitional arrangements, the number of work 
permits doubled from 2,097 in 2003 to 3,966 in 2004. However, this figure is below the 
predictions in the counterfactual scenario (6,200). In Norway, which partially opened its 
labour market and is booming because of the oil price hike, the number of released work 
permits increased from 18,170 in 2003 to 25,325 in 2004.
7   Meanwhile the Nordic countries 
tightly restricting migration from the CEECs experienced modest or declining migration 
flows.  In Denmark, 2,048 work permits were issued in 2004. Comparable figures for 2003 
are not available here. However, the number is pretty low relative to the predicted inflow of  
3,000 persons. In Finland, work permits dropped from 6,747 in 2003 to 2,169 in 2004.
8   
However, the Finnish Ministry of Labour reports that the number of posted workers has 
increased substantially since Eastern Enlargement.  
                                                           
6 We are grateful to Frank Berry and Gerry Hughes who provided information on work permits and personal public service 
numbers in Ireland. 
7 We are grateful to Jon Erik Dølvik from the Fafo Institute for Labour and Social Research for the provision of the data for the 
Nordic countries. 
8 However, the drop in Finish figures can be at least partially explained by the fact that no work permits are required for 




No information is available as yet on migration to the traditional destination of migrants 
from the CEECs, namely Austria, Germany and Italy, although according to statements of 
Government officials it would seem that migration from the CEECs has been stable after the 
Enlargement.  
 
Overall, the scattered information available at the time of writing point to some diversion of 
flows from countries tightly closing borders to countries with more liberal rules with respect 
to migration from the NMS.  This is particularly true for the English speaking countries, 
where migration figures exceed by far those of the migration projections. The Eastern 
Enlargement episode so far suggests that asymmetries in migration restrictions affect the 
geographical orientation of migration flows.  These diversion effects may become over time 
more important as networks of citizens from the CEECs are established in the new 
destinations, although they are unlikely to become as marked as in the case of differences in 
the enforcement of controls across the US-Mexico border (Boeri, Hanson and McCormick, 
2001) because there are language barriers in Europe.   
 
3. THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF MIGRATION RESTRICTIONS 
3.1. Is migration needed in open economies? 
Insofar as asymmetries in transitional periods affect the destination of flows from the 
CEECs, they are also likely to reduce their magnitude.  In this Section we evaluate these 
scale effects and provide some estimates of the overall costs of un-coordinated migration 
restrictions.  
 
Old and new Member States differ markedly in terms of factor endowments and factor 
productivities.  The book value of the physical capital stock per capita in the NMS is 
currently about one-tenth of the level in the EU-15.  International migration is just one of the 
potential channels leading from these differences in factor endowments to a new allocation 
of resources in the EU-25.  The other two channels, trade and capital movements, have 
already been operating  since the beginning of transition to a market economy.  
 
The economic impact of migration depends inter alia on whether and to what extent 
international migration substitutes or complements trade and capital mobility.  If migration 
substitutes trade and capital movements,  an isolated analysis of the effects migration tends 
to overstate its impact, since some of the effects of trade and capital mobility are lost. If it 
complements trade and capital mobility, an isolated analysis of migration tends to understate 
its effects, since we have to consider the effects of additional trade and capital movements 
as well. Unfortunately, economic theory does not provide clearcut answers to the question 
whether trade and factor mobility are substitutes or complements (see Box 2).  
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Box 2  Does migration substitute trade and other factor flows? 
 
In the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework, trade and factor mobility 
are substitutes as pointed out by Robert Mundell (1957) almost 50 years ago. Consider the 
simple case where two countries produce two goods with two factors and identical 
technologies.  If barriers to trade are removed, the capital abundant country will export 
goods which use capital intensively in production, and import goods which use labour 
intensively in production. The price for the capital intensive goods will rise and that for the 
labour intensive good will decline, while profits will increase and wages fall. The reverse 
holds for the labour abundant country. Under certain assumptions on technologies and 
preferences, factor prices will eventually equalise (Samuelson 1949; Lerner 1952). Hence, 
no incentives for factor mobility remain.  Analogously, the opening of capital or labour 
markets will result in the movement of the abundant factor into the country where this factor 
is scarce, leading to factor (and good) price equalisation as well. Thus, factor mobility 
reduces the incentives for trade in this framework: it is sufficient to open any of the three 
channels – trade, capital or labour mobility  – to achieve factor price equalisation. 
 
However, the predictions change significantly if we relax some of the most restrictive 
assumptions of the HOS model. The assumptions on technologies are particularly important. 
If there is a productivity gap between countries, which holds across all sectors, then trade 
will equalise only relative factor incomes (Trefler, 1987). This means that incentives for 
factor mobility will remain even if all barriers to trade are removed. If instead cross-country 
productivity gaps vary across sectors, trade and factor mobility can be complements: 
Assume for instance that two countries have identical factor endowments, but that one the 
two has a (Hicks-neutral) productivity advantage in the capital intensive sector. In this case 
this country will export capital intensive goods and import labour intensive goods, which 
will raise profits and reduce wages at home, whilst in the other country wages increase and 
profits fall. It follows that trade increases the incentives for labour to migrate from the 
country which has a comparative advantage in the capital intensive good to the country 
which has a comparative advantage in labour intensive production (Markusen, 1983).   
Moreover, trade theory has discussed a number of other cases where trade and factor 
movements are complements rather than substitutes:  In case of specific factors,  i.e. factors 
which are not mobile across sectors, trade may induce more factor mobility, making 
economies more dissimilar, and thus increasing even further the trade volume (Venables, 
1999; Collins et al., 1999).  In trade models with increasing returns to scale and 
monopolistic competition, factor mobility allow countries to attain economies of scale, 
increasing the real return to the factors of production at home, and, via this channel, induce 
further factor inflows. Thus, trade liberalisation in these models stimulates larger migration 
flows  (Krugman, 1991; Venables 1999).  
 
 
As economic theory does not provide unambiguous predictions, empirical evidence may 
offer some guidance. In the fifteen years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, East-West trade 
and capital flows increased dramatically, without reducing differences in income per capita 
and factor prices. Between 1988 and 2003, trade between the EU-15 and the NMS grew 
approximately by a factor of 6,
9  and the stock of foreign direct investment increased from 
virtually zero to 142.2 billion Euro (roughly one fourth of GDP in the NMS) by 2003 
(Hunya, 2005).  Nevertheless, economic convergence is slow: from the through of the 
transitional recession, GDP per capita are recovering in the region at an average annual rate 
                                                           
9 Authors’ calculations based on the Direction of Trade Statistics of the IMF. MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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of  3.4 per cent, compared with 2.1 in the EU-15
10.  Thus, the speed of convergence is in line 
with the rate estimated by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1995) drawing on data on the 
post-war period in Europe and the US.  At this rate, any initial gap in per capita income 
levels will be halved every 35 years.  Thus, even if trade and capital movements substitute 
migration, differences in wage levels will create monetary incentives for migration for 
decades. Following the predictions in the studies just reviewed in the previous Section, we 
can expect that free movement would yield an additional migration of 2 to 3 per cent of the 
population in the NMS moving to the EU-15 over the next 30 years, assuming a Barro-type 
speed of convergence. 
 
In this Section, we analyse the benefits and costs of East-West migration in the enlarged EU 
in a highly stylised model using the present differences in GDP and wage levels. This model 
allows us calibrate the effects of migration for the receiving and the sending countries under 
different assumptions as to the composition of the migrant population, the presence of 
institutions hindering wage adjustment, regional disparities in income levels and 
employment opportunities, as well as different levels of welfare benefits. Our goal is not to 
provide a formal cost-benefit analysis of migration restrictions, but simply to evaluate the 
sign of the interactions between, on the one-hand, un-coordinated migration restrictions and, 
on the other hand, different labour market institutions taking the example of the Eastern 
Enlargement. We also analyse whether and to what extent migration may reduce capital 
mobility in order to get some clues as to whether the effects of migration could be lower 
when accounting for capital inflows. 
 
Box 3 outlines the simulation model and lists the assumptions which provide the 
background for our analysis. The technical details of the model are presented in Appendix 
B. A natural starting point is the textbook case of a closed-economy with labour market 
clearing.  This is our reference case in the calibrations. At the current income disparities 
between the old the new Member States, the gains from potential migration can be 
substantial. Most of these gains accrue, however, to the migrants and their families, 
generating only small incentives for the receiving countries to open up their labour markets. 
Under more realistic assumptions as to wage adjustment in the receiving country, migration 
increases unemployment in the receiving country. Although the aggregate income gains 
from migration are still sizeable, incomes of the native population fall in this case. Thus, 
there is a trade-off between the overall gains from migration in the enlarged EU and the 
interests of the receiving countries (Section 3.2). However, migration can also “grease the 
wheels” (Borjas, 2001) of the labour market in the recipient countries, which display very 
low regional mobility of the workforce and often centralised wage setting institutions not 
compensating for regional differences in labour productivity.   
 
Allowing for regional differences in income levels and employment opportunities in the host 
country we obtain higher aggregate gains from migration and a lower adverse impact on the 
native population. Nevertheless, incentives for closing borders remain also in this case 
(Section 3.3).  Welfare benefits affect income of natives and migrants via various channels. 
They do it directly, by redistributing income from the natives to the migrant population if 
migrants are more than proportionally affected by unemployment and other social risks, as 
well as indirectly, by affecting the scale and composition of the migrant population. 
Although the impact of different levels of welfare benefits are moderate, within realistic 
ranges of welfare provision in the EU, the income of the native population declines as the 
generosity of the welfare system increases. However, the aggregate GDP in the enlarged EU 
is larger when welfare benefits are higher in the receiving countries, since they increase 
                                                           
10 Authors calculations based on the data provided by UN/ECE (2005). MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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incentives to move not only for welfare recipients, but also for other migrants. Thus, there is 
once more a trade-off between aggregate welfare in the enlarged EU and the interests of the 
receiving countries (Section 3.4).  
 
Box 3     Verbal description of the model 
 
The simulations in the following sections are based on a highly stylised model of two 
economies, which produce one good and apart from migration are closed.
11 Each economy’s 
output is produced with skilled labour, non-skilled labour and physical capital. The 
production function is characterised by constant returns to scale and is approximated by a 
simple Cobb-Douglas-function. Using a Cobb-Douglas function implies that the elasticity of 
substitution between the factors of production is one. Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) 
provide evidence that this is a reasonable approximation for the EU-15. For the US, Murphy 
and Katz (1992) estimate the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers 
at 0.7, and Borjas 1997, 1999) at 0.3, using another definition of the respective groups. 
Thus, some uncertainty with regard to the actual elasticity of substitution surrounds our 
results.  
 
For convenience, the domestic labour supply is treated as inelastic, and physical capital and 
the human capital endowments of natives and migrants are assumed to be fixed.  This means 
that we simulate the case of a short-term adjustment. In the long-run, the economy adjusts to 
a given stock of migrants by the accumulation of physical and human capital, such that the 
effects of a one-time increase of the labour supply through migration are expected to 
disappear over time. 
 
Due to a lack of data we use the share of manual and non-manual workers in the labour 
force as an approximation for the shares of unskilled and skilled labour, although this proxy 
is certainly crude. In the EU-15 the proportion of manual workers is around 40 per cent, in 
the new Member States around 50 per cent. Based on the book-value of fixed assets, the 
physical capital stock can be estimated in the new Member States at around 20 per cent of 
that in the EU-15. The share of manual workers in total income has been estimated in the 
EU-15 as being at 26 per cent, that of non-manual workers at 45 per cent, and that of capital 
at 29 per cent (Bauer/Zimmermann, 1997).  In the new Member States we assume that the 
respective shares are for manual labour 29 per cent, for non-manual labour 42 per cent, and 
for capital 29 per cent. Finally, we assume that production technologies are less productive 
in the new Member States, i.e. the productivity parameter in the production function has a 
value of 0.8 in the new Member States and of 1 in the EU-15. Under these assumptions, the 
difference in GDP per capita and wage levels of the model roughly matches the actual 
income gap.  
 
Finally, we assume for convenience that the receiving and the sending country have the 
same population size, i.e. that an emigration of one per cent of the labour force equals an 
immigration of one per cent. This distorts of course the actual picture since the population of 
the EU-15 is almost four times larger than that of the new Member States, but it may 
roughly capture the situation for Austria and Germany, whose population has almost the 
same size as that of the new Member States and who absorb around 70 per cent of the 
migrants from there. 
 
                                                           
11 The model employed here draws on similar models by Levine (1999) and Bauer and 
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The impact of migration on capital movements is ambiguous and, in any event, much too 
small to reduce the impact of migration on GDP and on the income distribution.  However, 
capital movements reduce migration more substantially (Section 3.5).  Our findings are 
broadly consistent with the simulation results of more complex CGE-models, which 
consider both the effects of migration on capital accumulation and the interaction with trade. 
At the same time, results from econometric studies on migration in Europe suggest that 
wage and employment elasticities to immigration may be smaller than in our simulations 
(Section 3.6)  
3.2. Adjustment with and without wage rigidities 
The impact of migration on welfare in the receiving and the sending countries depends 
heavily upon the assumptions as to the flexibility of labour markets. In addition to a 
perfectly flexible labour market, we consider here different levels of wage rigidity.  In the  
scenarios with rigid wages, wages are fixed at the beginning of each period by a bilateral 
bargaining monopoly of employer federations and trade unions. Next, firms hire manual and 
non-manual workers until their marginal product equals the agreed wage rate, as in a right-
to-manage model. As the participants in wage negotiations are aware that employment 
should be on the labour demand curve, collective agreements are somewhat (albeit not fully) 
responsive to unemployment. As part of the labour force remains unemployed, not all 
migrants are absorbed by the host labour markets. Following the Harris-Todaro tradition, we 
assume that jobs are allotted within the domestic and foreign labour forces by a random 
draw. The employment opportunities of migrants are, however, assumed to be lower than 
those of natives. This implies that the unemployment risk is partially shifted from natives to 
immigrants.  
 
In particular, in the simulations we assume that the unemployment risk of foreigners is twice 
as large as unemployment among natives. This is broadly in line with observed 
unemployment differentials between domestic and foreign population, conditioning on 
education levels.  As long as education levels of the migrants coming from the NMS are 
above those of the traditional immigrant groups, our assumption is rather conservative as to 
the employment opportunities of workers coming from the CEECs. Finally we assume that 
unemployed individuals receive an unemployment benefit, which is proportional to the post-
tax wage as it is the case in many continental European countries such as Austria and 
Germany.  Unemployment benefits are financed out of a uniform tax on labour income, 
which is endogenously set at the level clearing the social security budget. Thus, in this 
setting migration can affect the incomes of natives in the receiving and sending countries as 
well as incomes of migrants via three main channels: 
 
•  changes in factor incomes, i.e. changes in wages and capital rents; 
•  changes in employment opportunities; 
•  the tax rate. 
 
 




Impact of Migration on Income and Employment 
semi-elasticity between
wage and unemployment rate
  manual labour   -infinity   -infinity 0 0 -0.4 -1.0 -1.5
  non-manual labour   -infinity   -infinity   -infinity   -infinity -1.0 -1.5 -3.0
share of non-manual labour
in migrant population 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5
total GDP host country 0.70 0.71 0.50 0.70 0.48 0.56 0.62
source country -0.71 -0.76 -0.59 -0.83 -0.45 -0.55 -0.61
total region 0.30 0.29 0.19 0.27 0.22 0.25 0.28
total income host country 0.0011 0.0012 -0.1825 0.0091 -0.1979 -0.1161 -0.0608
natives source country -0.0010 -0.0018 0.1181 -0.0681 0.2575 0.1580 0.1036
total region 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0980 -0.0126 -0.0719 -0.0402 -0.0153
of these:
  manual host country -0.54 -0.04 -0.38 0.02 -0.62 -0.54 -0.51
  labour source country 0.29 -0.16 0.41 -0.23 0.55 0.45 0.40
total region -0.29 -0.07 -0.15 -0.05 -0.29 -0.26 -0.26
  non-manual host country -0.13 -0.45 -0.52 -0.47 -0.38 -0.30 -0.22
  labour source country 0.29 0.65 0.41 0.58 0.55 0.45 0.40
total region -0.01 -0.15 -0.26 -0.18 -0.13 -0.09 -0.05
  capital-owners host country 0.70 0.71 0.50 0.70 0.48 0.56 0.62
source country -0.71 -0.76 -0.59 -0.83 -0.45 -0.55 -0.61
total region 0.30 0.29 0.19 0.27 0.22 0.25 0.28
income of
migrants 145.80 132.81 144.57 130.75 146.54 146.86 147.07
post-tax wages
  manual host country - - -0.19 -0.01 -0.55 -0.51 -0.53
  labour source country - - 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.25 0.28
total region - - 0.12 0.35 0.05 0.13 0.17
  non-manual host country - - -0.52 -0.47 -0.30 -0.26 -0.20
  labour source country - - 0.41 0.58 0.15 0.21 0.23
total region - - 0.06 0.26 0.01 0.11 0.17
unemployment host country - - 0.27 0.00 0.30 0.19 0.12
rate source country - - -0.16 0.13 -0.30 -0.19 -0.12
total region - - 0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
  manual host country - - 0.63 0.04 0.35 0.26 0.15
  labour source country - - -0.33 0.18 -0.24 -0.16 -0.09
total region - - 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.01
  non-manual host country - - 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.13 0.08
  labour source country - - 0.00 0.00 -0.36 -0.21 -0.15
total region - - 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04
Source: Calculations of the authors. See text for assumptions.
rigid wages of manual
and non-manual labour
change in % at an immigration (emigration) of 1 % of the labour force








Table 3.1 displays the results of the model under three alternative scenarios. In the first 
scenario, our baseline, it is assumed that labour markets are clearing. In the second scenario, 
it is assumed that wages of manual workers are completely rigid, while wages for non-
manual workers are fully flexible. Finally, the third scenario adopts the milder form of wage 
rigidity discussed above to both segments of the labour market. The semi-elasticity of the 
wage rate is consistent with many empirical estimates (Bean et al.,, 1986; Blanchflower and MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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The first scenario assumes that 50 per cent of the migrant population are non-manual 
workers, the second scenario that 70 per cent are non-manual workers. Although the 
composition of the migrant population affects the distribution of income in the receiving 
countries, its impact on the aggregate in the sending and receiving countries is negligible. 
Under labour market clearing, gains are substantial: an immigration of one per cent of the 
population increases the GDP of the total region in both scenarios by around 0.3 per cent. 
Given that another two or three per cent of the population from the new Member States 
might migrate in case of a free movement, this figure gives an idea on the potential losses of 
migration restrictions for the enlarged EU. However, the gains from migration are not 
uniform across the board: most of the gains accrue to the migrants, whose income increase 
between 130 and 150 per cent in the different scenarios. In the receiving countries, the 
wages of manual or non-manual workers decline from 0.04 to 0.56 per cent, depending on 
the assumptions which are made as to the skill composition of the migrant population, while 
labour wins in the source countries. Although the total gains from migration are substantial, 
the aggregate gains for natives in the receiving countries and the losses for factor incomes of 
natives in the sending countries are negligible.  
 
In the scenarios with labour market rigidities the gains from migration drop to 0.19 to 0.28 
per cent, depending on the assumptions on the extent of the rigidities. The two scenarios 
which assume that wages for manual labour are fully rigid, while labour markets for non-
manual workers clear, employ again different assumptions as to the composition of the 
migrant population. In case of a high share of non-manual workers in the migrant 
population, the GDP gains increase substantially in the receiving country, since the demand 
for non-manual workers tends to increase. The last three scenarios employ more realistic 
assumptions as to the semi-elasticity of wages with regard to the unemployment rate.  They 
might represent labour market conditions in different countries, e.g. Germany at the one end, 
and the UK at the other end of the spectrum. Depending on these assumptions, the 
unemployment rate in the receiving countries may increase between 0.12 and 0.3 per cent, 
while the post-tax wages for manual workers drop by around 0.5 per cent and those for non-
manual workers by between 0.2 and 0.3 per cent. Moreover, aggregate income of natives 
fall in the receiving countries between 0.06 and 0.2 per cent.  
 
Thus, with wage rigidities, unemployment and other welfare benefits, migration poses a 
policy dilemma: despite substantial income gains in the total region, migration involves not 
only a redistribution of income in the receiving country:  it generates also an income loss for 
the total native population there. Although this loss is pretty small according to our 
simulations, it generates incentives for a closing-the-door policy which may prevent that the 
gains from migration in the total region are realised. 
3.3. Can immigration from the new Member States grease EU’s labour  
       markets? 
Regional labour mobility in the EU-15 is low: only about 1 workers out of 200 changes 
residence every year compared with 5 in the US (Boeri, McCormick and Hanson, 2001, 
                                                           
12 E.g., Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) find in many industrialised countries an elasticity between the wage and the 
employment rate of around 0.1. Transforming the semi-elasticities of our model into elasticities at the assumed unemployment 
rates, we get for the host countries an elasticity of between 0.04 and 0.15 for manual workers, and between 0.05 and 1.5 for 
non-manual workers.  The elasticities are higher in the sending countries, since the unemployment rate are higher there as well. MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1995; Decressin and Fatas, 1995; Puhanyi, 2000). According 
to George Borjas (2001), international migration can “grease the wheels of the labour 
market” when domestic labour mobility is low. Suppose that in the host country, say 
Germany, there are two regions: a low wage region and a high wage region. Regional 
migration equalises the costs and benefits of moving from the low-wage to the high-wage 
region for the marginal native migrant. Hence, there is no regional migration of natives. 
Moreover, let’s assume that the incentives for domestic capital mobility have disappeared, 
i.e. that the profits from investing in the low wage region equals its costs. As interregional 
wage differentials in Germany are lower than those between Germany and any CEEC, say 
Poland, incentives to migrate into the high-wage region are higher for Polish workers than 
for the German workers. Hence, immigration from Poland reduces the regional wage 
differential in the Germany. This increases the productivity of the remaining production 
factors, and the impact of international migration on GDP in Germany is higher than in the 
baseline.  Moreover, under centralised wage setting imposing to the low-productivity region 
the wage clearing the labour market in the high productivity region, migration reduces 
unemployment also in the low wage region, as discussed in Box 4. 
 
 




In presence of wage compressing institutions, international migration can reduce 
unemployment also in the low-productivity (high-unemployment) regions.  This additional 
“greasing the wheels” effect of migration is visually characterised in the above diagram. The 
panel on the left-hand side shows the market-clearing wage prevailing in the dynamic 
regions (called here the North) which is also paid – due to the imposition of the same 
contractual minima throughout the country – in the South.  At the initial equilibrium, the 
South experiences unemployment as the Northern wage acts as a binding minimum wage. 
Migration has two useful functions in this context. On the one hand, it increases 
employment and reduces wages in the North by shifting to the right labour supply (as shown 
by the bold line, S’).  On the other hand, migration, by acting on Northern wages, reduces 
labour costs also in the South (from W* to W
1) allowing partially to absorb its 
unemployment pool there (which shrinks from u to u
1).  
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Note that persisting regional wage and employment differences are hardly unrealistic. The 
share of foreign employees from CEECs in the Eastern German labour force – where wages 
are at 70 per cent and unemployment rates around twice as high as in the country average—
is only one-third of the German average. At the Bavarian border to the Czech Republic –
where wages are significantly above and unemployment rates below the country average—
the share of migrants to the total population is roughly three times the country average 
(Boeri and Brücker et al., 2001).  Similarly only 5 migrants out of 100 coming to Italy live 
in the Mezzogiorno, where unemployment is almost 3 times as large as in the North and 

















total GDP host country 0.87 0.70 0.90 0.57 0.81 0.57
source country -0.71 -0.71 -0.55 -0.55 -0.55 -0.55
total region 0.42 0.30 0.51 0.26 0.44 0.26
total income host country 0.0028 0.0011 0.0029 -0.1210 -0.1167 -0.1210
natives source country -0.0010 -0.0010 0.1580 0.1580 0.1580 0.1580
total region 0.0017 0.0005 0.0438 -0.0468 -0.0441 -0.0468
of these:
  manual host country -0.67 -0.54 -0.66 -0.57 -0.75 -0.57
  labour source country 0.29 0.29 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46
total region -0.38 -0.29 -0.35 -0.28 -0.41 -0.28
  non-manual host country -0.16 -0.13 -0.16 -0.28 -0.32 -0.28
  labour source country 0.29 0.29 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
total region -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.13 -0.10
  capital-owners host country 0.87 0.70 0.90 0.57 0.81 0.57
source country -0.71 -0.71 -0.55 -0.55 -0.55 -0.55
total region 0.42 0.30 0.51 0.26 0.44 0.26
income of
migrants 207.13 145.80 242.49 167.61 241.75 167.61
post-tax wages
  manual host country - - -0.45 -0.50 -0.49 -0.50
  labour source country - - 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
total region - - 0.31 0.18 0.24 0.18
  non-manual host country - - 0.04 -0.24 -0.10 -0.24
  labour source country - - 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
total region - - 0.43 0.18 0.31 0.18
unemployment host country - - -0.04 0.19 0.06 0.19
rate source country - - -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19
total region - - -0.17 -0.05 -0.12 -0.05
  manual host country - - -0.09 0.26 0.06 0.26
  labour source country - - -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
total region - - -0.20 -0.04 -0.13 -0.04
  non-manual host country - - -0.02 0.13 0.05 0.13
  labour source country - - -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21
total region - - -0.14 -0.06 -0.10 -0.06
GDP per capita is in the high wage region 25% above, in the low-wage region 25% below the country average. The labour force has in both
regions the same size. All migrants move into the high wage region. 50% of the migrants are manual workers. For the source country the
assumptions of the baseline scenario apply.
1) Clearing labour markets in the host and source country.-- 2) Clearing labour markets in high income region. The semi-elasticity between
wage and unemployment rate is -0.4 and -1.0 for manual and non-manual labour, respectively, in the low-income region. In the reference
case of homogeneous regions a semi-elasticity of -0.8 and -1.5 for manual and non-manual wages is assumed.-- 3) The semi-elasticity
of manual and non-manual wages is -2.0 and -3.0, respectively, in the high income region; for the low-income region and the reference case
 the same assumptions as in the previous scenario apply.
Source: Calculations of the authors. See text for further assumptions.
change in %-points at an immigration (emigration) of 1 % of the labour force
clearing labour markets
1
clearing labour markets in 
high-wage region
2
higher wage flexibility in high-
wage region
3
change in % at an immigration (emigration) of 1 % of the labour force
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In the calibration of this version of the model we assume that the host country consists of 
two regions, and that the proportion of manual and non-manual labour is the same in each 
region. The income shares of the production factors are the same as in the baseline. Total 
factor productivity and the physical capital stock are 25 per cent above the country average 
in the high income region, and 25 per cent below in the low-income region, in line with 
regional income disparities in several European economies. All the remaining assumptions 
are as in the baseline. We assume that all (foreign) migrants move to the high-income 
region, and that 50 per cent of the migrants are manual workers. 
 
Table 3.2. compares the outcomes under regional disparities with the case of homogenous 
regions. In particular, in the first scenario, labour markets clear in both regions of the host 
country and the source country. In the second scenario, labour markets clear in the high-
income region, but not in the low-income region. The third scenario wage flexibility is 
higher in the high-income region. 
 
The first scenario shows that the aggregate gains in GDP in the receiving country increase 
from 0.7 to almost 0.9 per cent, and in the total region from 0.3 to 0.4 per cent relative to the 
case of homogeneous regions. Moreover, the aggregate gains of the native population are 
more than twice as high as in the reference case. In the second scenario the gains increase 
even further, since under labour market clearing in the high wage regions the total 
unemployment rate in the receiving country is lower and labour supply in the prosperous 
region is larger. Under the assumption that wage rigidities are less marked in the rich region 
than in the poor region, there are still substantial GDP gains, but natives in the receiving 
country continue to experience an aggregate GDP loss. However, migration has a positive or 
only a small negative impact on employment (Table 3.2).  
 
The above results rely on the assumption that the production function exhibits constant 
returns to scale. In presence of economies of scale at the regional level, the gains for the 
receiving region and country would be larger. However, there would be losses for the 
sending countries, due to their shrinking workforce. 
 
Overall, regional disparities in income and employment increase the gains from migration 
for the enlarged EU substantially, but natives in the receiving countries can still lose out 
from migration if labour markets do not clear in the rich region. 
3.4. Migration and the welfare door 
The EU regulations require an equal treatment of natives and EU-migrants in terms of 
access to the welfare state. Member States are however allowed to protect themselves 
against ‘welfare shopping’, by restricting immigration from other EU countries if migrants 
cannot prove that they are able to finance their living out of work or wealth. So far intra-EU 
migration did not put pressure on the welfare states since unemployment and welfare 
dependency rates of EU-migrants are broadly in line with those of natives (Boeri, Hanson 
and McCormick, 2001). However, the equal treatment principle in presence of larger income 
differences in the enlarged EU may involve some welfare shopping by citizens of the NMS, 
potentially setting in motion a ‘race to the bottom’ in welfare provision in the enlarged EU 
(Sinn, 2000). 
 
In this Section, we analyse the impact of welfare benefits on incomes of natives and 
migrants. According to the Roy (1952) model, a welfare state compressing the wage 
distribution by skill level will increase the inflow of low-skill workers.  As migrants face a MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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higher risk of becoming unemployed, access to welfare benefits can also increase the size of 
migration flows. Thus, welfare benefits affect income in the receiving countries via two 
channels: they do it directly, by redistributing income from the native to the migrant 




Direct effect of unemployment benefits in the receiving country 
03 04 05 06 0
income of natives -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12
  of these:
  manual labour -0.46 -0.50 -0.51 -0.52 -0.54
  non-manual labour -0.23 -0.26 -0.27 -0.29 -0.30
income of migrants 126.83 137.14 140.45 143.68 146.86
post-tax wages
  manual labour -0.38 -0.45 -0.47 -0.49 -0.51
  non-manual labour -0.13 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24 -0.26
The simulation is inter alia based in the following assumptions: (i) the unemployment is before 
migration 15% and 5% for manual and non-manual labour, respectively; (ii) the unemployment 
rate of migrants is twice as high as that of natives; (iii) the semi-elasticity is -1.0 and -1.5 for manual
 and non-manual wages, respectively; (iv) the share of manual workers in the migrant population is 50%.
Source: Calculations of the authors. See text for further assumptions.
unemployment benefits in % of net wage
change in % at an immigration of 1 % of the labour force
 
 
The direct impact of an increase in welfare benefits (at a given immigration level of one per 
cent of the labour force) is calibrated in Table 3.3. As in previous scenarios, it is assumed 
that unemployment benefits offer a uniform replacement rate, and are financed by a flat tax 
on labour income. The replacement rates vary between zero and 60 per cent of the net 
income. Furthermore, it is assumed that the unemployment rate of migrants is twice as high 
as that of natives in each segment of the labour market. The latter assumption is very 
pessimistic, since we observe among EU migrants similar unemployment rates than among 
the native population. Nevertheless, even under these pessimistic assumptions, the loss in 
aggregate income for natives increases from 0.06 per cent of GDP to 0.12 per cent when the 
replacement rate increases from zero to 60 per cent. However, the post-tax income losses for 
manual labour increase from 0.38 to 0.51 per cent, and for non-manual labour from 0.13 to 













Total effects of unemployment benefits 
03 04 05 06 0
ratio of expected income host/home country
   manuelle Arbeitskräfte 2.40 2.63 2.70 2.78 2.85
   nicht-manuelle Arbeitskräfte 2.16 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.18
size of migration (in % of home pop.) 2.44 2.56 2.60 2.64 2.67
share of manual labour in migrant pop. 44.84 47.17 47.83 48.44 49.01
total GDP host country 1.33 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.50
source country -1.35 -1.45 -1.45 -1.45 -1.52
total region 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.66
total income host country -0.16 -0.23 -0.25 -0.27 -0.31
natives source country 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.44
total region -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.11
of these:
  manual host country -0.83 -1.14 -1.21 -1.27 -1.21
  labour source country 0.88 1.06 1.09 1.12 0.99
total region -0.33 -0.51 -0.55 -0.59 -0.59
  non-manual host country -0.73 -0.77 -0.78 -0.79 -0.95
  labour source country 1.30 1.30 1.28 1.25 1.46
total region -0.20 -0.23 -0.24 -0.25 -0.31
  capital-owners host country 1.33 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.50
source country -1.35 -1.45 -1.45 -1.45 -1.52
total region 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.66
income of
migrants 123.50 133.63 137.10 140.59 141.36
unemployment host country 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.52
rate source country -0.45 -0.49 -0.49 -0.49 -0.51
total region -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
  manual host country 0.49 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.56
  labour source country -0.30 -0.37 -0.38 -0.40 -0.34
total region 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
  non-manual host country 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.47
  labour source country -0.63 -0.63 -0.61 -0.60 -0.71
total region -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12
The scale of migration and the share of manual workers in the migrant population is determined endogeneously.--
The simulation is inter alia based in the following assumptions: (i) the unemployment is before migration
15% and 5% for manual and non-manual labour, respectively; (ii) the unemployment rate if migrants is twice
as high as that of natives; (iii) the semi-elasticity is -1.0 and -1.5 for manual and non-manual wages, respectively.
Source: Calculations of the authors. See text for further assumptions.





In Table 3.4. we allow the level of welfare benefits to affect also the size and composition of 
migration flows applying realistic assumptions as to the elasticity of migration with respect 
to the income differential. In particular, following Harris and Todaro (1970) we assume that 
jobs are allocated in each period by a random draw among the labour force, but that the risk 
of being unemployed is twice as high for migrants than for natives. Since foreign workers 
face a higher risk of unemployment, incentives to migrate, notably among the low-skilled, 
increase with the replacement rate.   
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The number of migrants increases from slightly more than 2.4 per cent of the source 
population to almost 2.7 per cent when the replacement rate increases from zero to 60 per 
cent, i.e. by less than 0.3 percentage points. The share of manual workers in the migrant 
population also increases from 45 per cent to 49 per cent, i.e. by no more than 4 percentage 
points. Both the GDP in the receiving country and in the enlarged EU increase with the 
replacement rate. This is due to the fact that a higher level of welfare benefits increases the 
incentives to migrate for everybody, not only for those who become later on recipients of 
unemployment benefits. Larger migration flows generate a higher income level via a more 
efficient allocation of labour. The unemployment rate increases in the receiving country, but 
falls in the enlarged EU with the replacement rate because unemployment is higher in the 
source region. Finally, the aggregate income of natives falls with the replacement rate in the 
receiving countries.  
 
Thus, the scenario with unemployment benefits increases the conflict of interests between 
the enlarged EU and the receiving countries. Under realistic assumptions about 
unemployment rates of the migrant population, an increase in welfare benefits raises income 
in the total region. This counter-intuitive results stems from the fact that higher welfare 
benefits increase also the incentives for to migrate for those who will work in the receiving 
countries. In contrast, the income of natives in the receiving countries will fall with 
increasing welfare benefits. However, under a realistic range for the replacement rate 
(between 40 and 60 per cent of post-tax wages), the income losses for the native population 
from additional welfare payments and changes in the scale and composition of the migrant 
population are rather small.   
3.5. Does migration substitute FDI and other capital movements? 
The transition to a market economy in the CEECs triggered substantial capital flows to the 
region. The overwhelming share of these capital flows are foreign direct investments (FDI), 
ranging between 10 and 24 billion Euros per year, while the inward FDI stock amounted to 
142.2 billions in 2003.
13  It is difficult to predict the sign of the effects, if any, of migration 
on these FDI flows. ‘Vertical’ FDIs are motivated by differences in factor endowments and 
factor prices, while ‘horizontal’ FDIs are driven by market access and the exploitation of 
scale economies.
14 Empirical estimates of FDIs include therefore variables related to the 
market size (e.g. aggregate GDP) as well as measures of differences in factor endowments 
(e.g. differences in GDP per capita or skill endowments) (Carr et al., 2001; Blonigen et al., 
2003; Geishecker and Görg, 2005).  Migration can negatively affect FDIs by increasing 
wages and per capita GDP levels in the sending countries.  The effect of migration on 
horizontal FDIs is less predictable because migration, on the one hand, increases the size of 
markets in the immigration country, hence factor incomes in the enlarged EU, but, on the 
other hand, reduces the size of the market in the sending country, hence, the incentives to 
invest therein. The empirical literature does not provide guidance as to which of these 
different effects is likely to prevail (see Annex B.5). 
 
                                                           
13 Hunja (2005), based on the balance of payments statistics of the National Banks. 
14 See Markusen (1984) and Markusen and Venables (1998) for vertical models, and Helpman (1984) and Helpman and 







The impact of capital movements 
 
FDI itself can substitute for migration. Table 3.5 presents scenarios in which we allow a 
sizeable flow of the capital stock to flow from the West to the East (1 per cent of the capital 
stock in the West corresponding to 1 per cent in the East). We assume that 50 per cent of the 
migrants are manual workers and that wages are responsive not only to unemployment, but 
also to changes in capital endowments. In particular, the semi-elasticity of the wage of 
semi-elasticity between clearing fixed manual
wage and unemployment rate labour markets wages
  manual labour   -infinity 0 -0.4 -1.0 -1.5
  non-manual labour   -infinity   -infinity -1.0 -1.5 -3.0
total GDP West -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.31 -0.30
East 3.79 3.79 4.68 4.03 3.58
total region 0.84 0.80 1.05 0.88 0.76
income of
  manual West -0.28 -0.28 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29
  labour East 2.56 2.50 4.27 3.83 3.34
total region 0.58 0.51 1.01 0.88 0.74
  non-manual West -0.36 -0.36 -0.34 -0.32 -0.32
  labour East 4.77 4.71 4.98 4.18 3.76
total region 1.02 0.99 1.08 0.88 0.77
  capital-owners West -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.31 -0.30
East 3.79 3.79 4.68 4.03 3.58
total region 0.84 0.80 1.05 0.88 0.76
post-tax wages
  manual West -0.23 -0.23 -0.26 -0.27 -0.27
  labour East 1.37 1.32 3.13 3.11 2.83
total region -0.60 -0.70 -0.16 0.14 0.21
  non-manual West -0.36 -0.36 -0.34 -0.32 -0.31
  labour East 3.79 3.79 2.46 2.51 2.73
total region 1.02 0.93 0.44 0.43 0.50
unemployment West - 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02
rate East - -1.34 -2.20 -1.43 -0.92
total region - -0.65 -1.08 -0.70 -0.45
  manual West - 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.04
  labour East - -2.68 -2.55 -1.59 -1.14
total region - -1.44 -1.39 -0.86 -0.62
  non-manual West - - 0.01 0.00 0.00
  labour East - - -1.84 -1.26 -0.70
total region - - -0.83 -0.57 -0.32
Source: Calculations of the authors. See text for assumptions.
change in %-points at a movement of 1% of Western capital
rigid wages of manual
and non-manual labour
change in % at a movement of 1% of Western capitalMIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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manual workers with respect to an increase in the capital stock is 0.2, and that of non-
manual workers is 0.3. Under these assumptions, the capital flow increases total GDP in the 
enlarged EU by 0.8 to 1 per cent. The aggregate gains are larger under rigid labour markets, 
as unemployment is higher in the East than in the West. Wages fall in the host country by 
around 0.3 per cent, and the unemployment rate increases slightly by 0.02-0.004 percentage 
points. In the East a substantial increase in GDP (between 3.8 and 4.7 per cent) is observed, 
together with a drop in the unemployment rate by 0.9-2.2 percentage points, and an increase 
in wages by 1.4-3.8 per cent.  
 
We analyse the interaction between migration and FDI in two scenarios. In the first 
scenario, we allow migration of 1 per cent of the population in the East to affect, via its 
impact on GDP and GDP per capita, the scale of FDIs and we evaluate the overall impact 
including this second round effect of the change in FDIs on income and employment. In the 
second scenario, we analyse how the capital flow described above affects the size of 
migration flows, and again second round effects. The scale of FDI is determined by an 
empirical estimation of FDI-stocks (Görg and Geishecker, 2005) which is motivated by the 
capital-knowledge model (Markusen, 2002)
15. FDI stocks are explained, inter alia, by the 
joint GDP of the two countries, the difference in their aggregate GDP and the difference in 
GDP per capita (See Appendix B.5. for details) 
 
Table 3.6 shows that the impact of migration on capital flows is negligible. Under 
reasonable assumptions on wage rigidities, the migration of 1 per cent of the labour force 
increases GDP in the receiving country by 0.56 per cent, reduces it in the sending country 
by 0.55 per cent, and increases at in the total region by 0.25 per cent (see Table 3.1).  
According to our simulations, this reduces the net investment from the West in the East by 
no more than 27 million Euros.  As a consequence, the second round effects of migration via 
FDI are (almost) negligible. 
 
The picture changes considerably when we consider the reverse type of interaction, from 
FDIs to migration.  A flow of 1 per cent of the capital stock from the West to the East 
increases the GDP in the East by 4.3 per cent and reduces it in the West by 0.3 per cent (see 
Table 3.5). This reduces migration by 0.13 per cent of the labour force and the potential 
GDP gains from migration by 0.07 per cent (Table 3.6).    
 
Thus, while we there is almost no substitution of capital movements by migration, capital 
movements can substitute for migration. This asymmetry can be explained by the relative 
size of the capital flows posited in our scenarios (a 10 per cent increase in the capital stock 
in the East!) and the fact that the impact of migration on capital movements is ambiguous, 
while capital inflows increase GDP and wages in the receiving country and therefore 
unambiguously reduce incentives to migrate. 
 
 
                                                           
15 The “knowledge-capital-model” by Markusen (2002) provides a hybrid framework in which both vertical and horizontal 




Substitutional effects of migration and FDI 
 
4.  PERCEPTIONS AND CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN MIGRATION   
   RESTRICTIONS 
4.1. How to read our results 
The back-of-the-envelope calculations presented in the previous section provide of course 
no more than a hint to the actual magnitudes involved, and a number of important caveats 
apply.  
 
First, we have ignored the interactions between migration and trade. Analogously to capital 
movements, migration can be a substitute or a complement to trade. If migration is a 
substitute for trade, then its effects on wages and unemployment are likely to be smaller.   
capital stock West -0.001 -
East 0.007 -
total labour force West - -0.13
East - 0.13
total GDP West 0.00 -0.07
East -0.04 0.07
total income West 0.00 0.02
natives East -0.04 -0.02
of these:
  manual West 0.00 0.07
  labour East -0.03 -0.06
  non-manual West 0.00 0.04
  labour East -0.04 -0.06
  capital-owners West 0.00 -0.07
East -0.04 0.07
unemployment West 0.00 -0.02
rate East 0.02 0.02
  manual West 0.00 -0.03
  labour East 0.03 0.02
  non-manual West 0.00 -0.02
  labour East 0.02 0.03
Source: Calculations of the authors. See text for further assumptions.
effects of a movement of 1% of
capital stock in the West workforce in the East
change in %
change in %-points
effects of substitution of
change in %




Second, we have neglected the accumulation of physical and human capital. The effects of a 
one-term shock in labour supply diminish however over time in the course of capital 
accumulation, since the economy will eventually achieve the same factor proportions as 
before the shock. Our results have therefore only a short-run character, they disappear over 
time. Nevertheless, under realistic assumptions on the convergence of capital stocks to their 
steady state values, the impact of migration can be felt for rather long time periods.  Our 
findings are consistent with results from more complex CGE models, which rely on an open 
economy framework and consider capital accumulation. However, econometric studies find 
a smaller, if any, impact of migration on wages and employment than in our scenarios. The 
latter should therefore be interpreted as an extreme (pessimistic) characterisation of the 
labour market effects of migration in the receiving countries (Box 5).  
 
 
Box 5  Evidence from other studies 
 
The results of our simulation model can overstate the actual impact of migration since the 
accumulation of physical and human capital are ignored. Moreover, the possible substitution 
of trade through migration is not considered by our model. It is therefore instructive to 
confront our results with the findings from more complex simulation models which are 
based on an open-economy framework and which also include the dynamic effects of 
migration. There exist meanwhile a number of studies which have calibrated the impact of 
Eastern Enlargement on GDP, wages and employment in complex computable equilibrium 
models.  Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999) assess the impact of Eastern Enlargement on 
Austria in an open-economy CGE-model, assuming inter alia that the number of unskilled 
workers increase by 10.5 per cent and the number of skilled workers by 2.1 per cent. As a 
result, the wages for unskilled workers drop by 5 per cent and those of skilled workers 
increase by 2.7 per cent, i.e. the respective elasticities are similar to those we have found if 
we consider that our simulations are based on a one per cent increase. Heijdra et al. (2002) 
calibrate the effects of migration, trade and fiscal transfers for national welfare in an open-
economy CGE model, and find inter alia that migration in the context of enlargement 
increases the German GDP by 0.7 per cent. Given that the simulation relies on the 
assumption that the manual-labour force increases by 6.2 per cent and the non-manual 
labour force by 0.8 per cent, this result is slightly below our estimates. In another study 
Kohler (2002) finds overall GDP gains from migration in the context of Eastern 
Enlargement of 1.2 per cent for Germany, using the same migration scenario as the study as 
Hejdra et al. (2002). Thus, the GDP effect is here slightly higher than in our projections. 
Finally, Brücker and Kohlhaas (2004) have simulated the impact of migration for Germany 
in a CGE-model employing different assumptions on the education levels of the migrant 
population. They find that, depending on the assumptions on the qualification of the migrant 
population, that wages can decline by 0.5 to 0.6 per cent at an immigration of one per cent 
of the labour force, while the unemployment rate increases by 0.02 to 0.1 percentage points. 
Again, these results are in the range of our findings. Altogether, although more complex 
CGE-models allow to capture both the dynamic effects of migration and its affects on the 
structure of production and trade, they yield very similar results as our simple simulation 
model. 
 
The labour market impact of migration has been furthermore examined in a large number of 
econometric studies in Europe. These studies rely on a cross-section of either regions or 
branches, and use variations in the migrant density in order to identify the impact of 
migration on wages and employment. This approach suffers from various methodological 
problems, inter alia it is hard to control for the fact that migrants tend to move into MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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prosperous regions or industries. The empirical results depend therefore heavily on the 
methods by which it is controlled for this endogeneity problem. Nevertheless, in particular 
the more recent studies in Europe find much smaller wage and employment effects that our 
simulation results suggest (see e.g. Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller, 1996; Bauer 1997; 
Gavasto et. al. 1999; Trabold and Trübswetter, 2003; Brücker, 2002 for a review). This 
could be interpreted as support for the hypothesis that the open-economy framework is more 
appropriate to analyse the economic effects of migration than the closed economy 
framework. Indeed, Hanson and Slaughter (2002) find evidence for the existence of 
Rybczyinski-effects in the US. The view that migration is neutral for wages and 
employment of natives in the receiving countries has been recently challenged by George 
Borjas (2003), who finds wage effects which are similar to those in our simulation exercise 
in an econometric study which refers to changes in the factor proportions at the national 
level.  
 
Thus, given the controversial empirical evidence, we can conclude that our simulations form 
a bottom-line with respect to the wage and employment of migration in the receiving 
countries, the actual impact can also be much moderate or even neutral. Nevertheless, given 
the uncertainty on the wage and employment impact of migration, incentives for a closing-
the-door-policy remain in the receiving countries. 
 
Third, we considered only legal migration. A closing-the-door immigration policy implies 
that illegal migration increases at the expense of legal migration. In contrast, opening the 
labour market and the welfare door creates incentives for illegal migrants to move into the 
regular labour market. This in turn generates – relative to the state of illegal migration –
benefits for the public sector and the total economy in the receiving countries. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of Eastern Enlargement, where a substantial number of 
illegal migrants work already in the neighbouring countries. 
 
Fourth, the analysis of the impact of migration on the welfare state has been limited to 
unemployment benefits. The fiscal balance of migration is however affected also by a 
number of other factors.  Pension schemes are here particularly relevant, since the pensions 
of migrants fall short of their contributions in most EU countries. Depending on pension 
systems and other welfare institutions, the fiscal effects of migration can turn to be positive, 
even if they are more than proportionally affected by unemployment.
16  
 
Overall, the simulations provided in the previous section neglect a number of factors which 
could alleviate or even change the sign of the economic effects of migration on the receiving 
country.  Nevertheless, insofar as they suggest that receiving countries may also lose out 
from immigration, they are useful in understanding concerns of public opinion  in the EU-
15.  This in turn can improve our understanding of the evolution of migration policies in the 
EU discussed in Section 1.   Below we first relate our predictions as to the economic costs of 
migration to perceptions of public opinion and then we assess whether reforms in migration 
policies are driven by these concerns of public opinion (internal pressure) or by the spillover 
effects of decisions made in other countries (external pressure), notably the fear that the 
diversion effects, documented in Section 2 in the case of Enlargement, could materialise. 
 
                                                           
16 As an example, Bonin et al. (2000) and Löffelholz and Köpp (1998) find substantial positive effects for Germany, while Sinn et 
al. (2001) conclude that the impact is negative. For the Netherlands, which has another pension system than Germany, Roodenburg 
et al. (2003) find negative effects using the same approach as Bonin et al. (2000) for Germany. MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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4.2. What drives the tightening of migration policies? 
Section 2 suggests that migration policies entail substantial spillover effects, while Section 3 
points to short-term costs of migration in rigid labour markets, possibly inducing public 
opinion to support restrictive migration policies.   
 
Which one of these factors – the fear of a potential diversion of migration flows or the 
perception of the economic costs of migration – has been behind the tightening of migration 
restrictions occurred in the last decade?  In order to answer this question it is necessary to 
proceed in two steps.  We first analyse whether the costs characterised in the previous 
section do play indeed an important role in shaping preferences for migration.  Next, we 
look at migration policy developments against the background of these perceptions and of 
policies in other countries. 
 
The nature and evolution over time of preferences for migration policies in Europe can be 
best characterised by drawing on the Eurobarometer, a public opinion survey carried out by 
Gallup for the European Commission since 1970. The Eurobarometer covers the EU-15 
countries and includes a number of questions about migration and policy co-ordination, 
which are repeated in different waves, although regrettably the survey does not have a 
longitudinal structure.  
 
In order to assess preferences of Europeans concerning migration policy we follow a two-
step procedure.  At first we isolate the role played by personal characteristics in shaping 
preferences.  Next we investigate the correlation of the residual cross-country dispersion in 
opinions with economic variables which are likely to affect, in light of the analysis in the 
previous section, support to more restrictive policies.   
 
Table 4.1. 
The role played by personal characteristics in shaping preferences for 
migration policies  
(Eurobarometer, 1994, 1997 and 2000) 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer, various waves. 
Note: two signs denote significance at 1, a sign at 5 per cent. 
  There are too many migrants  Migrants increase 
unemployment  Migrants abuse welfare 
  1994 1997 2000 1994 1997 2000 1994 1997 2000 
male   +         + +  +   + +   +   + + 
15-24   - -   - -   - -     - -  - -   - -   - -  - - 
25-34   - -   - -       -     -   - -   
55-64    + +   +  + +   +     + +     
over 64  +   +     + +       + +   -   
household  family        +       
low-edu       + +       + +       
high-edu  - -   - -   - -  - -    - -   - -   - -   - -   - - 
right-wing   + +   + +   + +   + +   + +   + +   + +   + +   + + 
left-wing   - -   - -   - -   - -   - -   - -   - -   - -   - - 
employed   +     + +           + +   + + 
self-employed          
retired       + +       +     + +    + + 
high-income   + +   - -     + +  - -   - -     - -   - 
low-income  - -     - -   - -     - -   - -     - 
 
 





Table 4.1. summarises results from probit regressions of various questions elicting 
preferences for restrictive migration policies which have been repeated at different survey 
dates.  In particular, they concern perceptions that the “boat is full”, that is, there are already 
“too many migrants”, that “migrants increase unemployment” and that “migrants abuse of 
the welfare system”.  Personal characteristics include age, gender, education and labour 
market status as well as ideological (left or right-wing) factors.  We also control for the 
characteristics of the household (number of components). Including country-dummies in 
these regression we explain between 12 and 16 of the total variance.  Without country 
dummies we could explain only about 3  to 5 per cent of the total variation.  The reference 
individual is a middle-income woman aged 35 to 54, with a secondary educational 
attainment, unemployed, and located at the centre of the political spectrum.  
 
Unsurprisingly we find that migration is perceived as a threat mainly among older (hence 
immobile) men, and with low levels of education.   This is consistent with the findings of 
previous work on preferences over immigration policy (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Boeri 
et al., 2002; Mayda and Rodrik, 2001 and O’Rourke, 2003) as well as with the distribution 
of losses characterised in the previous section. We also observe that political affiliation to 
the right increases negative perceptions about migrants.   
 
In the second stage we aim at explaining the residual cross-country variation in terms of 
aggregate variables which, according to our simulations, should affect the overall 
perceptions about migration in a specific country.  One of these variables is represented by 
the scale of redistributive policies.  The previous section suggests that migration may be a 
fiscal burden in countries with relatively generous welfare systems.  Dynamic political-
economic model of migration  -- e.g., Benhabib (1996) and Dolmas and Huffman (2003) – 
also indicate that support to migration could be lower in countries where redistributive 
policies are more important.  Part of these effects should also come indirectly, via changes 
in the composition of migration flows, notably an increase in the share of low-skilled 
migrants.  Thus we include the fraction of migrants with lower levels of education, as 
measured by the European Labour Force Survey. Also in this case, our predictions are 
consistent with economic theory: Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002), extending Metzler and 
Richard (1981), as well as Hassler et al. (2002) suggest that it is the percentage of low-skill 
types among migrants to negatively affect decisions about the acceptability of migrants.  In 
light of the results in the previous section, we also expect to find more negative perceptions 
of migration in countries with labour market “rigidities”, such as a high coverage of 
collective bargaining and relatively generous replacement rates for their unemployment 
benefits.   
 
 
Results should be interpreted with caution due to the limited degrees of freedoms and 
measurement errors.  They suggest that negative perceptions of migrants are larger in 
countries with a more generous social welfare system and with more “rigid” wage setting 
institutions.   This seems to indicate that it is indeed the type of economic costs of migration 











Table 4.2  
Explaining (conditional) cross-country differences in perceptions 
  Dependent variable: country-dummies in 
regression of the toomany question 
Social policy expenditure  0.05 
 (0.01)*** 
% of high edu migrants  -0.00 
 (0.01) 
Coverage of coll.bargaining  0.53 
 (0.19)*** 






The dependent variables are country fixed-effects estimated in the first stage 
regressions Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source:   Eurobarometer 37 (1992), 41.1 (1994), 47.1 (1997), 53 (2000) 
Eurostat for data on social expenditure, Oecd for data on union 
coverage and replacement rate of unemployment benefits 
 
 
Overall, perceptions about migrants are broadly in line with the implications of our model as 
to the economic costs of migration.  This holds both for the within-country distribution of 
benefits and losses (it is mainly the low-skilled to fear job and fiscal competition from 
migrants) and for the cross-country differences (where countries with a richer welfare state 
and rigid wages display a public opinion less favourable to migrants).   
 
The above does not imply that policies are driven by domestic public opinion.  In order to 
characterise the determinants of the tightening of migration policies occurred in the last 
decade we need to compare cross-country differences in the evolution of the policy stance 
towards migrants to i) changes in public opinion about migrants, and ii) the policy stance in 
neighbouring countries.  This is done in Table 4.3 which displays, in the first two columns 
on the left-hand-side measures of the evolution of policies, notably the net number of 
restrictive reforms of migration policies and the change in the value of the migration policy 
index introduced in Section 2.  The next two columns display the 1992-2000 or 1994-2000 
(1992 was in the middle of a recession) variation in the percentage of respondents who agree 
with the statement that there are already “too many migrants”.    Finally, the last two 
columns on the right-hand-side of Table 4.3. measure the source of potential policy spillover 
effects, namely the cumulative number and sign of reforms in bordering countries (border) 
and the overall number of reforms in the EU weighted by distance of each country from the 
country’s capital (distance). 
 
Two facts are important.  First, migration policy have been tightened in most countries just 
while public opinion was becoming more favourable to migrants.  Indeed, the simple and 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients between any of the first two columns and the third or 
fourth column are negative and often statistically significant.  Second the evolution in each 
individual country is more in line with developments in other countries, especially bordering 





Internal and external pressures and immigration policy reforms 
 
  Reforms  ∆ index  ∆ too many 
(1992-2000) 






Austria 2  0.29      3  2.09 
Belgium 2    0.5  -3.7  5  2.51 
Denmark 2  0.43  -11.1  -4.6  2  2.37 
Finland 1  0.43      2  1.89 
France 1  -0.21  -10.9  -13.0  7  2.55 
Germany 0  0.07  -12.2  -4.7  16  2.69 
Greece 0  0.27  12.3  -4.7  2  1.24 
Ireland 3  -0.14  19.3  21.0  1  2.06 
Italy 1  0.14  -24.4  -15.6 6  1.85 
Netherlands 1  0.27  -8.3  0.4  5  2.72 
Luxemburg 0  0.07  -3.0  1.6  7  2.91 
Portugal  -1 0.07  5.4  10.4  -2 1.47 
Spain 0 -0.37  -0.7  -6.3  -2  1.64 
Sweden 1        6  2.2 
UK 5  0.56  -14.7  -11.2  16  1.8 
Notes:  
Reforms adds up reforms in immigration policy carried out in any country between 1996 and 2004.  
Reforms tightening rules are entered with a positive sign and reforms making it easier access to migrants 
with a negative sign.  Hence a positive number signals a tightening of the immigration policy stance. 
∆ index tabulates the changes in the value of the immigration policy index defined in section 1 between 
1994 and 2004.   
∆ too many: variation in the percentage of respondents stating that there are “too many migrants” in the 
1992 and 2000 waves of the Eurobarometers or in the period 1994-2000.   
Spillover (border) Counts reforms in bordering countries in the period 1996-2004. 
Spillover (distance) Counts reforms in all the other countries weighted by the distance from the capital of 
that country.   
 
    
 
 
4.3. Do citizens accept to co-ordinate policies? 
The above suggests that policy spillovers may be relevant and hence co-ordination in 
migration policies may have the potential to induce less restrictive policies. But are 
Europeans ready to delegate power to supra-national authorities in the field of international 
migration?   
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Fig.4.1 - Decisions about the immigration policy should be made 
































Figure 4.1. displays the percentage of individuals who are in favour of delegating authority 
to the EU in the field of migration policies
17.  Although support to policy co-ordination 
slightly declined over time and there is a high degree of heterogeneity in the answers from 
country to country, in most countries there is still a majority favourable to delegating 
authorities to Brussels in this respect. Thus, the main obstacles to policy co-ordination may 
not from citizens, but from domestic politicians who can be induced to use migration as a 
scapegoat to gather more votes in the elections.   
 
It should also be stressed that policy co-ordination may itself contribute to reduce the cross-
country heterogeneity in willingness to delegate authority, which is highlighted by Figure 
4.1.  This is because co-ordinated policies may reduce distortions in the allocation of 
migrants.  To give an example, Tranaes and Zimmermann (2004) found that migrants to 
Denmark are less skilled and less likely to work than in Germany. These differences in the 
composition of migrants can be a by-product of migration policy itself or of other 
institutional features, e.g., the generosity of redistributive policies.  The fact that Denmark 
recently reformed its own regulations by rewarding more skilled migration suggests that in 
the mind of policy-makers, if not of citizens themselves, a better migration policy can 
deliver better educated workers.   Put another way, it may not be that Danes are against any 
type of policy co-ordination because they have different preferences about migration than 
other Europeans, but simply that Danes fear that a EU-policy would be different from the 
one that they have just adopted, and presumably believe that it is a good policy. 
 
5. HOW TO CO-ORDINATE THEN?  FINAL REMARKS 
In this paper we analysed the economic consequences of uncoordinated immigration policies 
taking as reference the Eastern Enlargement episode.  Economic gains from international 
migration are bound to be high, presumably higher than those from the further integration of 
                                                           
17 Citizens are asked whether or not they agree with the statement that “Decisions about 
immigration policy should be made by the EU (vs. the national Government). MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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goods and capital markets. However, while the removal of barriers to trade and capital 
movements gained momentum during the last two decades, we noticed a tightening of 
migration restrictions, most notably in Europe where regional labour mobility is low, hence 
there are even larger potential gains from migration. Migration barriers of the individual 
Member States vis-à-vis non-EU and non-EEA countries were tightened in recent years and 
the break-down of the Berlin wall and the fall of the iron curtain in Eastern Europe did not 
fundamentally altered this picture. Emigration barriers in the East have been replaced by 
immigration barriers in the West, so that East-West legal migration has been so far rather 
moderate. Moreover, free labour mobility from the NMS has been postponed for up to 7 
years, as potential destination countries engaged in a ‘race-to-the-top’ of barriers to 
migration of workers from the NMS. These “transitional arrangements” carry with them 
substantial economic costs. Available information reviewed in this paper suggests that 
migration flows from the East have been diverted towards the countries which have partially 
opened their labour markets and that the overall level of East-West migration falls short of 
its potential, likely due to these restrictions.  
 
These restrictions entail substantial economic losses for the enlarged EU.  Under realistic 
assumptions about the convergence of GDP and wage levels, we estimated that migration to 
the West of 1 per cent of the population in the NMS increases the aggregate GDP in the 
sending and receiving countries by 0.2 to 0.3 per cent.  We also expect the impact of 
migration on East-West capital flows to be weak. Given that trade and capital movements 
will equalise income and wage levels only in the long-run, the economic losses associated 
with migration restrictions are not of a second order of magnitude in a stagnating Europe. 
 
Why are then Governments closing the door to migrants?  This paper suggests that there are 
potentially two co-ordination failures behind this outcome.  The first is a lack of 
coordination across countries receiving the migrants.  The second involves the relation 
between sending and recipient countries.   
 
The stylised representation of the benefits and costs of migration offered in Section 3 sheds 
some light on the reasons for the first type of co-ordination failures. Under realistic 
assumptions about wage rigidities in the labour markets of the receiving countries, 
international migration may actually result, at least temporarily, in a net aggregate loss in 
the country of destination. These losses are mitigated if we assume that regional disparities 
in wage and employment opportunities exist and that migrants exploit these opportunities, 
“greasing the wheels” of Western labour markets. Other factors increasing the benefits of 
immigration in the West can be trade (when the marginal demand for labour is determined 
by tradable sectors) and improvements in social security associated with inflows of younger 
cohorts of workers.  Nevertheless, insofar as citizens in the West perceive a risk that 
immigration can be harmful, they will induce Government to close borders.  We showed in 
this paper that negative perceptions about migration are in line with the predictions of our 
model as to those factors which can increase the cost of immigration in the West.  In 
particular, negative perceptions are stronger in countries receiving many low-skilled 
workers, having a rather generous welfare state and rigid labour markets.  However, these 
factors cannot explain the trend in migration policies.  These “rigid” institutional features 
are being – albeit gradually -- relaxed in the West just while migration restrictions are 
getting tighter.  And indeed the tightening is occurring even in countries where public 
opinion is getting over time more favourable to migrants.  The trend in migration policies 
can be better explained by spillovers across jurisdictions, namely the fear that the closing of 
borders in neighbouring countries could entail a substantial diversion of flows. 
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How can these spillovers be internalised by policy co-ordination at the EU-level?  What 
type of migration restrictions, if any, should be defined at the EU level?  
 
A number of scholars, including Hans-Werner Sinn, have been recently advocating a policy 
closing temporarily the welfare door to migrants in the enlarged EU.  Welfare access by 
migrants involves some (rather modest) fiscal losses in the receiving countries. More 
importantly this strategy could buy popular support to more realistic migration policies in 
the individual EU countries.  However, this could happen at the cost of reducing 
significantly the size of East-West migration flows.  The issue is that migration is a two-
sided and long-term investment: the migrant pays upfront the mobility costs and invests in 
future income streams, while absorbing the risk of not finding a job immediately, a risk 
which is rather high in Europe. Barring access to welfare in the initial years when the risk of 
unemployment is higher, is a strong deterrent to migration, including skilled and intra-EU 
migration, the type of mobility which is badly needed in Europe and the kind of migrants 
who can be better assimilated.  Closing welfare may also just not be a feasible policy option. 
The US experience is revealing in this respect (Boeri, McCormick and Hanson, 2001): in 
1996, the welfare system was partly decentralized to the states and limitations were 
introduced in the US to access to welfare benefits for legal immigrants. For instance, legal 
non-asylum immigrants who arrived in the country after August 1996 were barred from 
receiving food stamps or using Medicaid for 5 years. The proponents of this reform were 
hoping that a more decentralized system would make the states more cautious in providing 
expensive welfare benefits to immigrants. The reform failed on both accounts. Since 1996, 
the provision excluding immigrants from some welfare services has been challenged in the 
courts; and by 1997, the Congress started repealing the tougher provisions. Finally, the 
states felt the political pressure to maintain the benefits at the previous levels under the 
federal system; this is particularly evident in states like California, in which immigrants 
account for more than 15 percent of the electorate. This is bound to happen in Europe as 
well.  There are numerous countries, among those some which already have absorbed a 
large number of migrants, which discuss to close welfare doors (like Germany, pushed to 
close welfare by the advisers to its Finance Minister).  The new EU constitution however 
signed in Rome in October 2004 explicitly prohibits “discrimination on grounds of 
nationality” (article I-4)  and establishes the principle that “everyone residing and moving 
legally within the EU is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages” (article II-
34).  Introducing national restrictions on access to welfare will likely open a Pandora’s box 
of Court rulings. Many EU directives and decisions of the European Court of Justice have, 
after all, already introduced in the European material constitution non-discrimination clauses 
on the grounds of nationality and have explicitly recognized the entitlements to social 
security benefits and social services. Thus, a decentralized system that strongly 
discriminates against immigrants can face political resistance, is easily challengeable in 
courts and ultimately reverts to the previous system.  
 
A better policy for Europe could be the co-ordination of migration policies themselves 
towards third countries.  This would avoid policy spillovers and hence overall involve a less 
restrictive approach. As to the nature of this co-ordination, we advocate a EU-wide 
immigration quota, regulating the entry via a point system allowing immigrants to freely 
choose the country of destination within the EU.  A point system would encourage the type 
of migration which is most beneficial to Europe, notably skilled migration of young 
workers.  Another advantage of having a point system in place is that it could greatly 
simplify migration regulations, e.g. making unnecessary ad-hoc policies for the highly-
skilled migrants and integrating asylum policies in this broader framework (e.g., adopting 
humanitarian points). Finally a EU-wide point system could be easily adjusted to MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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agreements with sending countries, potentially addressing the second type of co-ordination 
failure, namely the one between sending and receiving countries. 
 
Overall, our analysis suggests that the bill paid by Europe for these co-ordination failures is 
high.  The founding Members of the EU were aware of this co-ordination problem already 
in 1957 when they defined the free movement of labour as one of the four fundamental 
freedoms of the Common Market. The rules of the Community nowadays prevent that 
national governments increase migration barriers for EU-citizens or exclude them from 
welfare benefits. We documented that this increases aggregate income in the Community.  
As labour mobility in the Community is low and un-coordinated migration policies vis-à-vis 
third countries result in tighter migration restrictions, the EU should now make the second 
step, that is, it should co-ordinate the immigration policies vis-à-vis third country nationals.  
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Appendix A   Estimation of the migration potential 
The model on which the estimate of the migration potential in Section 1.3 is based explains 
migration stocks by the income differential between the receiving and the sending country, 
the income in the home country, and the employment rates in the receiving the sending 
country. More specifically, the long-run relationship between migration stocks and the 
explanatory variables is given by 
 
  ( ) () ( ) ( ) it i it ft it it ft it e a e a w a w w a mst ε µ + + + + + = ln ln ln ln 4 3 2 1 ,           (A1) 
where mstit denotes the migrant stock as a percentage of the population in country i, wft and 
wit the wage rates in the receiving and the source county, respectively, ef and ei the 
employment rates in the receiving and source county, respectively, µi a country-specific 
fixed effect, and εit the error term. Finally, i = 1,..., N and t = 1,...,T are the (source) country 
and time indices, and f denotes the host country.  
 
This parsimonious specification of the migration function has a long tradition in the 
literature. The choice of economic variables is primarily based on the classical contributions 
of Hicks(1932), Sjaastad (1962) and Harris and Todaro (1970). Following the expected 
income hypothesis of Harris and Todaro (1970), it is assumed that individuals form 
expectations on income levels, which are conditioned by the employment opportunities in 
the respective locations. Home income has been added as an additional variable to the 
income differential, since liquidity constraints might affect the propensity to migrate (Faini 
and Venturini, 1995). Thus, it is expected that the income differential, home income and the 
employment rate in the host country have a positive sign, while the employment rate in the 
sending country has a negative sign. 
 
One feature sets the model employed here apart from the traditional specification of macro 
migration functions. While most models in the literature assume that a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between migration flows and the explanatory variables exists, it is stated here 
that an equilibrium between migration stocks and the explanatory variables emerges in the 
long-run. While the flow-model is based on the assumption that all individuals are 
homogeneous with regard to their preferences and human characteristics, the stock-model 
assumes that individuals are heterogeneous. As a consequence, for a given difference in 
expected income levels, the equilibrium migration stock is achieved eventually when the 
benefits of migration equals its costs for the marginal migrant. Note that the stock model 
does not rely on the assumption that all migration is permanent. In contrast, under the 
assumption of heterogeneity, the duration of migration varies across individuals. In 
equilibrium, the emigration from younger cohorts equals the return migration from older 
cohorts, as long as the rate of natural population growth is similar in the home population 
and the migrant population.
18  
                                                           
18 See Brücker and Schröder (2005)  for a formal derivation of the stock model.  MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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The hypothesis, whether migration stocks or flows and the explanatory variables are 
characterised by an equilibrium relationship, or, in more technical terms, are cointegrated, 
can be tested statistically. For our data set
19 we can prove that explanatory variables (GDP 
per capita, employment rates) and the migration stocks are instationary and follow the same 
stochastic process,
20 while the migration rates are stationary. Thus, the migration rate and 
the left-hand variables cannot be cointegrated. Moreover, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the migration stocks and the explanatory variables are cointegrated for our data set, i.e. 
that a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between this variables.
21 
This allows us to estimate a panel cointegration model. The final estimation 
equation is specified in form of an error correction mechanism (ECM), 
which enables us to estimate both the long-term cointegrating vector and the 
short-run dynamics. Note that the ECM is a very flexible functional form 
and imposes few restrictions on the adjustment process. Specifically, the 
estimation equation has the form 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () ()
it i it
t i it ft it t i f
t i t f t i t i f t i it
mst b e b e b w b w w b
e b e b w b w w b mst b mst
ε µ + + +
∆ + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
+ + + + = ∆
−
− − − − −
z η'
1 , 10 9 8 7 6
1 5 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 , 1
ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln
,   (A2) 
where zit is a vector of institutional variables, η is the corresponding vector of coefficients, 
and ∆ is the first-difference operator. Three dummy variables are considered here which 
should capture different institutional conditions for migration: guestworker agreements 
between the source country and Germany, free movement between the source country and 
Germany, and dictatorship in the source country. The first two variables should capture 
reduced legal and administrative barriers for migration, the last variable a political ‘push’ 
factor in the source country. 
 
Table A1 reports the estimation results. In all three regressions we find a positive and 
significant sign for the income differential, the income in the sending country and the 
employment rate in the receiving country, and a negative and significant sign for the 
employment rate in the sending country. Thus, the results for the economic variables 
confirm our expectations. With regard to the institutional variables, guestworker recruitment 
and dictatorship in the sending country have a positive and significant impact on migration. 
The dummy variable for the free movement in the EU appears only significant in the last 
regression. 
 
The three estimation models presented in Table A1 impose different restrictions on the error 
term. The first estimator is a standard fixed effects estimator, which assumes that the errors 
are homoscedastic, and that they are not correlated across groups. The second estimator 
allows for heteroscedasticity in the error terms, and the third estimator for both, 
heteroscedasticity and correlation across groups (spherical disturbances). The test statistics 
                                                           
19 The descriptive statistics is available from the authors upon request. 
20 In technical terms, they are all integrated of order one, i.e. I(1) variables. 
21 The results of the panel unit-root tests and the panel cointegration tests are available from the authors upon request. MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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show that (i) the model which allows for heteroscedastic errors is preferable relative to the 
model which assume homoscedastic error terms, and that (ii) the model which allows for 
both heteroscedastic and correlated error terms is preferable relative the model which allows 
only for heteroscedastic errors. Thus, we base our projection of the migration potential on 
the last specification of the estimation model. 
 Table A1  Estimation Results 
 FE
1)   FGLS(HET)
2) FGLS  (HET&COR)
3)  
coefficient t-statistics  coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics 
ln(wf/wh)t-1 0.087
**  2.21 0.042
*  1.92 0.084
***  5.32 
ln(wh)t-1 0.104
***  3.57 0.056
***  3.40 0.099
***  6.43 
ln(ef)t-1 0.733
***  3.36 0.342
***  3.65 0.613
***  7.03 
ln(eh)t-1 -0.163
*  -1.95 -0.106
**  -2.31 -0.131
***  -11.77 
msth,t-1  -0.150
***  -6.06 -0.126
***  -8.66 -0.143
***  -20.78 
∆ln(wf/wh)t  0.102
**  2.33 0.037
  0.33 0.120
  1.11 
∆ln(wh)t  0.358
***  2.99 0.184
  1.57 0.282
**  2.61 
∆ln(ef)t  0.851
***  3.22 0.408
*  1.83 0.548
**  2.62 
∆ln(eh)t  -0.225
  -0.97 -0.164
  -1.37 -0.163
***  -5.70 
∆msth,t-1  0.411
***  4.75 0.302
***  7.89 0.410
***  19.03 
FREEit  0.008
  0.91 0.000
  0.07 0.006
***  3.69 
GUESTit  0.098
***  6.27 0.105
***  5.69 0.109
***  11.64 
DIKTit  0.062
**  2.01 0.012
  0.77 0.048
***  5.91 
adjusted R
2 0.61   - -     
Log-
Likelihood -   1280 1661     
Notes: The symbols 
***, 
**, 
* denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
1) Fixed Effects (within) regression. The F(17, 543)-statistic for the null hypothesis that all intercepts 
are equal is 9.80
**.—2) Feasible Generalised Least Squared (FGLS) regression with country dummies.  
The robust estimation of the covariance matrix allows for groupwise heterscedasticity in the distur- 
bances. The χ
2(18)-test statistic for the LR-Test of the heteroscedastic vs. the homoscedastic model 
is 761.04
**.-- 3) FGLS regression with country dummies. The robust estimation of the covariance  
heteroscedastic vs. the homoscedastic model is  761.04
**.-- 4) The χ
2(33)-test statistic for  
the LR-test of the heterosecedastic and correlated vs. the homoscedastic model is 762.58.-- 
All regressions include dummy variables which control for statistical breaks in 1972 and 1987. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
   
Two other technical aspects are worthwhile to mention: First, the regression diagnostics 
clearly rejects the assumption that the intercept terms are uniform across countries. This is 
particularly important since some estimates of the migration potential employ pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) models, which rely on the assumption that the intercept term is 
equal (Sinn et al., 2001; Flaig, 2001). This hypothesis is not only rejected by specification 
tests, a comparison of the pooled OLS and fixed effects estimators also show that the MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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forecasting performance of the pooled OLS models is weak (Brücker and Siliverstovs, 
2004). 
 
Second, it is well-known that dynamic fixed effects or pooled OLS model might be subject 
to an estimation bias if the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term 
(Nickell, 1981). This bias disappears with the time dimension of the panel, but can still 
affect results in our data set with 32 observations over time (Judson and Owen, 1999). There 
exist several estimation procedures which address this bias, inter alia the Generalised 
Methods of Moments (GMM) estimators by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and 
Bover (1995). However, since the group dimension of our panel is relatively small, the 
efficiency of these estimators can be weak in our data set. Indeed, it can be shown that the 
forecasting performance of these GMM-estimators is poor relative to the fixed effects 
estimators presented in Table A1 (Brücker and Siliverstovs, 2004). 
 
The projection of the migration potential for countries out-of-sample involves the problem 
that the intercept term differs between individual countries in the fixed effects regression. 
These differences reflect the impact of time-invariant variables such as geography, 
language, culture, etc. on migration. We follow here the procedure by Fertig (2001) and 
Brücker and Boeri (2001) and explain the fixed effects in a second regression by time-
invariant variables. More specifically, we regress the fixed effects obtained in the first 
regression against geographical distance, distance squared, a dummy variable for 
geographical proximity (ADJACENT), a dummy variable for geographical location in the 
East of Europe (EAST), and a dummy for common language. These variables explain almost 
90 per cent of the variance in the fixed effects (Table A2).  
Table A2  Explanation of country-specific fixed effects 
 FE  FE(HET)  FE(HET&COR) 
observations 18  18  18 
  coefficient  t-statistics coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics
dist × 1,000  -0.464
**  -2.59 -0.430
***  -2.88 -0.450
***  -2.64
dist
2 × 1,000,000  0.403
***  3.35 0.369
***  3.67 0.388
***  3.39
ADJACENT  0.204
***  4.76 0.176
***  4.96 0.195
***  4.81
EAST  0.041
  0.85 0.032
  0.81 0.039
  0.85
LANGUAGE  0.073
  1.62 0.056
  1.49 0.067
  1.57
CONSTANT  -0.839
***  -13.75 -0.394
***  -7.75 -0.795
***  -13.70
adjusted R
2 0.87   0.87 0.87
F-statistic 22.88   24.67 23.08   
Notes: The symbols 
***, 
**, 
* denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Calculations by the authors.       
 
The regression results for the intercept term in Table A2 and for the slope parameters in 
Table A1 are then used for the simulation of the migration potential from the CEEC-10 to 
Germany, which are presented in Table 1.4 in the main text. The assumptions with regard to 
the explanatory variable are described there as well. MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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Appendix B   Description of the simulation model 
The simulations in Section 3 are based on a highly stylised model of two economies, which 
produce one good and are – beyond migration and capital movements – closed. In this annex 
we describe the basic features of the model (see also Brücker, 2002). Many aspects of the 
model described here draw on Levine (1999), but in contrast to the Levine model we 
conceive that the labour market is split in an unskilled and a high-skilled segment and that 
the elasticity of wages with respect to the unemployment rate differs between the segments 
(see Bauer/Zimmermann 1997 for a similar assumption). Moreover, we consider a number 
of other features like unemployment benefits, regional wage and employment differences 
and treat the volume of migration as endogenous in a later stage of the analysis. The model 
relies of course on a number of arbitrary assumptions, but it nevertheless allows to analyse 
some of the fundamental mechanisms by which migration may affect income, employment 
and welfare of the affected parties in the host and source countries. 
Outline of the basic model 
The output of the economies in the host and the source country for migration is produced 
with unskilled labour, skilled labour and physical capital. Production technologies have 
constant returns to scale and are approximated by a Cobb-Douglas function, such that 
 
      h f i K H L A Y
i i i i
i i i i i , ,
1 = =
− − β α β α ,     (B1)  
where  i Y   denotes output,  i A  a productivity parameter, which reflects the level of 
technology and institutions,  i L  unskilled labour,  i H  skilled labour, and  i K  physical 
capital.  i α ,  i β , and 1- i α - i β  are the shares of unskilled labour, skilled labour and capital, 
respectively, in total income, and i ∈{f, h} is an index for the country of destination,  f,  and 
the country of origin, h, respectively. Let  i N  be the initial, pre-migration, endowment of 
country i with unskilled labour, and let  i S  be its initial endowment with skilled labour. 
Then the post-migration allocation of unskilled labour in the country of destination and the 
source country is given by  
     
   M N N M N N h h f f γ γ − = + = , ,     (B2) 
 
where M denotes the number of migrants, and γ  the proportion of unskilled labour in the 
migrant population. Analogously, the post-migration allocation of skilled labour can be 
written as 
 
   () ( ) M S S M S S h h f f γ γ − − = − + = 1 , 1 ,  (B3) 
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where 1-γ  denotes the proportion of skilled workers in the migrant population. In all 
simulations we assume that the total labour force, i.e. the number of skilled and unskilled 
workers, is equal in the host and the home country in the pre-migration state. The model has 
a comparative static character in the sense that capital accumulation is not considered and 
that the productivity parameter is assumed to be fixed.   
 
Wages and the demand for labour are determined sequentially. In the first stage, wages are 
fixed by a bilateral bargaining monopoly between trade unions and employer federations.
22 
In the second stage, profit-maximising firms hire labour until the marginal product of labour 
equals the wage rate; the participants in the wage negotiations are aware of this. Given this 
wage-setting mechanism, wages respond – albeit imperfectly – to the unemployment rate in 
the economy as well as to other factors such as capital endowments which affect labour 
productivity. This allows us to express the wage rate for unskilled and skilled labour, 
respectively, as functions of the unemployment rate and capital endowments in the 
economy, i.e. as 
 
   ( ) 0 , 0 , , , , , , > < = i K i u i i L i i L f f K u f w ,   (B4) 
and 
   ( ) 0 , 0 , , , , , , > < = i K i u i i H i i H g g K u g w ,  (B5) 
 
where  fu,i and gu,i denote the partial derivative of the wage rates with respect to the 
unemployment rate, and fK,i and gK,i  the partial derivatives of the wage rates with respect to 
the capital stock in economy i. The unemployment rates for unskilled and skilled labour are 
defined as  () i i i L N L u − = 1 ,  and  ( ) i i i H S H u − = 1 , , respectively. Thus, we allow 
the elasticity of wages with respect to the unemployment rate to differ for unskilled and 
skilled labour.  
 
Assume for the moment that the endowment with physical capital is fixed, i.e. that 
i i K K = . The impact of migration on employment is then determined by the marginal 
product of skilled and unskilled labour and the flexibility of wages in the respective labour 
markets, i.e. by  







− − − −
i
i
i i i i i i N
L
f K H L A
i i i i 1
1 ) 1 ( β α β α α ,   (B6) 
and 







− − − −
i
i
i i i i i i S
H
g K H L A
i i i i 1
1 ) 1 ( β α β α β ,   (B7) 
                                                           
22  The argument elaborated here is consistent with different modes of wage setting, e.g. models with a monopoly union or a 
bilateral bargaining monopoly (e.g. Layard et al. 1992), efficiency wage theories (e.g. Salop 1979) or shirking-models (Shapiro 
and Stiglitz 1984).  The analysis considers however only the long-run response of wages to a change in labour supply, i.e. the 
impact of short-run fluctuations in (un-) employment rates is ignored  (Levine 1999). 
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where we used the definitions for the unemployment rate on the right-hand side. 
 
Equations (B6) and (B7) are a system of four equations which determine, together with the 
production function in equation (B1) and the definitions in equations (B2)-(B5), the values 
for Lf, Lh , Hf  and Hh. Write the semi-elasticity of the wage of unskilled labour with respect 
to unemployment as  ( ) i L i L i u i w u f , , , / − = η , and, analogously, the semi-elasticity of the 
wage of skilled labour with respect to unemployment as  ( ) i H i H i u i w u g , , , / − = µ .
23 
Differentiating the system in equations (B6) and (B7) implicitly with respect to M and 
substituting from (B1)-(B5) yields then -- after a good deal of algebra -- the marginal 
response of employment of unskilled and skilled labour to migration in both economies: 
    
    () ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )
() ( ) [] () ( ) [] f f f H f f f L f f








β α µ β η α
µ β γ µ β η γ
− − + − − + −




, 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 ,        (B8) 
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β α µ β η α
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− − + − − + −




, 1 1 1 1
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1 ,        (B9) 
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1 ,   (B10) 
 
   () () ( ) () ( ) [ ] ( )
() () [] () () [] h h h H h h h L h h








β α µ β η α
η α γ η α µ γ
− − + − − + −




, 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 .   (B11) 
 
Thus, the higher the flexibility of labour markets, i.e. the higher the semi-elasticity between 
the wage and the unemployment rate, the higher is the marginal response of employment 
with respect to migration.  
 
Consider two extreme cases: in the first case, the labour markets are completely flexible, i.e. 
∞ → i η ,  ∞ → i µ  and  i i i i S H N L → → , .  In this case, equations (B8) and (B10) 
converge to γ and (1-γ), respectively, and equations (B9) and (B11) to -γ and -(1-γ), 
respectively. The labour force in the host country increases then exactly by the number of 
immigrant workers, and the labour force in the home country is exactly reduced by the 
number of migrant workers. This case corresponds to the textbook example of the impact of 
migration in an economy with clearing labour markets and an inelastic supply of native 
labour (e.g. Wong 1995, pp. 628-632). In the other extreme case, wages for unskilled labour 
are perfectly inflexible, i.e.  0 → i η , while wages for skilled labour are perfectly flexible, 
i.e. . 0 → i µ  In this case, immigration of unskilled workers does not change employment of 
unskilled workers, such that it simply increases unemployment of unskilled workers in host 
                                                           
23 Νοτε τηατ τηισ ιµπλιεσ τηατ τηε ελαστιχιτψ οφ τηε ωαγε ρατε φορ υνσκιλλεδ ανδ σκιλλεδ λαβουρ ωιτη ρεσπεχτ 
το τηε υνεµπλοψµεντ ρατε αρε ηI uL,i and µi uS,i, respectively. MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
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countries. However, the immigration of skilled workers increases employment of unskilled 
workers in host countries, since skilled and unskilled workers are complements under the 
assumptions of our model. Thus, the impact of migration on (un-) employment and income 
depends essentially on the composition of the migrant population with respect to their skill 
levels. The cases of flexible labour markets and wage rigidities are calibrated in Table 3.1 of 
Section 3. 
The impact of capital mobility 
Capital mobility can be treated analogously to labour mobility. Changes in the endowment 
with physical capital affects the marginal productivity of unskilled and skilled labour and, 
hence, labour demand. Assume again that wages and the demand for labour are determined 
sequentially. Since capital is not fixed, wages respond now to both, changes in the 
unemployment rate and changes in the endowment with capital. Write the semi-elasticity of 
the wage of unskilled labour with respect to physical capital as  i L i K i w f , , / = ω , and, 
analogously, the semi-elasticity of the wage of skilled labour with respect to unemployment 
as  i H i K i w g , , / = ϖ . We can then differentiate the system in equations (B6)-(B7) 
implicitly with respect to physical capital, which gives after substitution from (B1)-(B5) for 
the marginal response of employment of unskilled and skilled labour to a change in the 
physical capital endowments 
 
    () () ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( )
() () [] () () [] i i i H i i i L i









β α β η α
ω µ ω β ϖ β µ β α
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1 ,  (B12) 
and 
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, 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 .   (B13) 
 
The allocation of jobs among natives and migrants 
For an analysis of the impact of migration on income of natives and migrants, it is necessary 
to make additional assumptions on the employment opportunities of natives and migrants. 
Following the traditional approach of Harris and Todaro (1970), we assume that in each 
period all jobs are randomly allocated among the total labour force, i.e. among natives and 
migrants. However, we modify the selection process in allowing for the possibility that 
employment opportunities of migrants are below that of natives, i.e.  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) f L f f NL f L f ML u N M p u p , , , , 1 1 1 , 1 − − + = − = γ λ λ ,     (B12) 
and 




where pMj and pNj denote the employment probability for migrants and natives in the host 
country, respectively (j = L, H), and the factor λ (0 < λ ≤ 1) accounts for the possibility that 
the employment opportunities of migrants are below that of natives.  Note that this implies 
that some of the employment risks of natives are shifted to migrants. For natives in the home 
country we assume that the employment probabilities are simply given by  
 
pL,h   =  1-uL,h,    pH,h = 1-uH,h.         (B14) 
The role of unemployment benefits 
Migration does not only affect income by wages and employment, but also by welfare 
benefits. In order to consider the impact on welfare benefits, we assume that unemployment 
benefits are a fixed proportion of post-tax wages, i.e. ( ) ij i i w t b − 1 , where ti denotes an 
uniform income tax-rate, i = f, h, the respective country, and j = L, H, skilled and unskilled 
labour, respectively. Physical capital is not taxed. If we assume that the budget is balanced 
and if we ignore all other public expenditures, then taxes must equal unemployment costs, 
which gives for the tax rate  
 
  () ()( ) () i Hi Hi i i Li Li i
i Hi Hi i Li Li
i i S w u b N w u b
S u w N u w
b t
− − + − −
+
=
1 1 1 1
,      (B15) 
 
where Ni and Si are the post-migration endowments with unskilled and skilled labour as 
determined by equations B2 and B3. The impact of a different size of unemployment 
benefits and, hence, different tax rates, on the income of natives and migrants are calibrated 
in Table 3.3 in Section 3. 
Endogenous migration 
So far we have assumed that the migration rate is given. For an analysis of the impact of 
migration policies on welfare it is however necessary to consider also the determinants of 
the migration rate. We limit our analysis here to the simple case of permanent migration (see 
again Levine 1999 for a similar approach).  
 
Assume that migrants do not own physical capital. The net present value of expected income 
in the foreign country for an infinitively living household is then given by 
 
() [] H L j w p b p V fjt fjt f fjt fjt , , ~ 1
0




τ δ , (B16) 
 
and in the home country by MIGRATION, CO-ORDINATION, FAILURES AND EU ENLARGEMENT 
 
56 
  () [] H L j w p b p V hjt hjt h hjt hjt , , ~ 1
0




τ δ ,         (B17) 
where δ < 1 denote the discount factor, and  ijt i ijt w t w ) 1 ( ~ − =  the post-tax wage. The 
employment probabilities are given by equations (B12) and (B13).   
 
For convenience we assume that manual workers expect that the following generations will 
remain manual workers, too, while for non-manual workers the converse holds. A risk-
neutral individual will migrate if the difference in the net present value from living in a 
foreign country and at home exceeds the net present value of all pecuniary and non-
pecuniary costs of migration, i.e. if 
 








τ δ t j t hj t fj C V V .          (B18) 
 
If we write the migration costs on the left hand side of (B18) as a fraction of the net present 




















,               (B19) 
 
i.e. the ratio of expected real income in the foreign and the home country has to exceed the 
cost factor 1 + cj. Note that there are no transitional dynamics in the system and all variables 
jump immediately to its steady state values such that we can drop the time subscript (Levine 
1999). 
 
Following Faini and Venturini (1995), Ludema and Wooton (1999) and Brücker and 
Schröder (2005), we assume that individuals differ with respect to their preferences and 
their costs to migrate. In the steady state, the net present value of expected income equals 
just the net costs of migration for the marginal migrant. Thus, we assume that a 
macroeconomic function exists, which determines the share of migrants in the home 
population as a function of the expected difference in per capita income in the steady state. 
Depending on assumptions about the distribution of the costs to migrate and preferences 
across the population, we can conceive different functional forms. For our simulations, we 
assume that the share of migrants in the labour force of the home population is a semi-
logarithmic function of the ratio of expected income. This functional form is conceived in 
several macro studies on the determinants of migration (e.g. Hatton, 1995; Boeri and 
Brücker, 2001). Thus, the steady state share of migrants in the force of unskilled workers of 
the source country is given by the probability that the ratio of expected income in the host 
and the home country equals the costs for migration for the k
th individual, i.e. by 




































, ln 1 Pr θ
γ
,       (B20) 








































,     (B21) 
 
i.e. we allow that the propensity to migrate differs for skilled and unskilled workers. 
 
Based on these assumptions, we calibrated in Table 2.4 in Section 2 the impact of the 
income differential and different rates of unemployment benefits on the overall migration 
potential and the shares of unskilled and skilled workers in the migrant population. 
Are migration and capital mobility substitutes or complements? 
Under the assumptions of this simple model, East-West migration increases aggregate GDP 
in the receiving countries and reduces it in the sending countries. The impact on the GDP 
per capita in the receiving and the sending countries is ambiguous, it depends on labour 
market conditions and human capital endowments of the migrant population.  Whether the 
convergence of GDP levels tends to increase or to decrease international capital flows, is an 
open question. The theoretical and empirical literature on foreign direct investment 
distinguishes between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ forms of international investment activities. 
The basis for our analysis of the impact of migration on capital mobility forms the 
“knowledge-capital-model” by Markusen (2002), in which both types of multinational 
investment activities emerge endogenously, depending on the characteristics of the home 
and the foreign country. Several empirical specifications have been derived in the literature 
from this model, which include both variables which are related to the market size of the 
respective economies (e.g. aggregate GDP), and variables which refer to differences in 
factor endowments (e.g. differences in GDP per capita or skill endowments). The findings 
of this literature on the impact of factor endowments are ambiguous: While the results of 
Carr et al. (2001) indicate that differences in factor endowments have a positive impact on 
capital movements, Bloningen et al. (2003) argue that the empirical model in Carr et al. 
(2001) is misspecified. Consequently, they find no significant impact of differences in factor 
endowments in their specification. Finally, Geishecker and Görg (2005) distinguish between 
FDI in manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors and find for manufacturing FDI a 
positive impact of the difference in per capita GDP, while the aggregate impact is 
ambiguous. 
 
For the simulations carried out here we assume, following the literature, that international 
investments are function of the both the market size and the difference in factor 




() fh h f fh h f h f h f fh X y y D a y y a Y Y a Y Y a a K ' 4 3 2 1 0 η + − + − + − + + + = ∆ ,   (B26) 
 
where ∆Kfh is a measure for the bilateral movement of physical capital from sending country 
f to receiving country h (e.g. FDI), Yi is the aggregrate GDP in country i (i = f, h),  yi the 
GDP per capita, and Dfh a dummy variable which has a value of one if the GDP per capita in 
the sending country is higher than in the receiving country, and a value of zero, if otherwise, 
Xfh is a matrix of other variables such as trade volumes or trade costs, and η the 
corresponding vector of parameters. Thus, bilateral investment from sending country f in 
receiving country h is a function of joint GDP, the difference in aggregate GDP, the 
difference in per capita incomes and the income of country f relative to country h. For a 
motivation of this specification see Blonigen et al. (2003), Carr et al. (2001) and Geishecker 
and Görg (2005).  
 
Table B1  Explanation of Foreign Direct Investment 
  coefficient  t-statistics
GDPf + GDPh  0.019
*** 30.13
|GDPf - GDPh|  -0.013
*** 6.61
|gdpf - gdph|  -257,903
*** 3.99
Df x |gdpf - gdph|  170,164
*** 3.15
|GDPf-GDPh| x |gdpf - gdph| / 1,000,000  -0.105
*** 16.68
|gdpf - gdph| x Xfh  -40,144
* 1.66





Observations  6,819   
Number of country pairs  1,227   
R
2  0.29   
Notes: (i) The symbols ***, **, * denote levels of significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-level.- 
           (ii) In model (1) the F-test statistic for the fixed pair effects is 12.99, which is significant 
            at the 1% level.      
           (iii) The dependent variable is the stock of FDI from country f in country h. Df denotes a 
            dummy which has a value of one if gdpf > gdph, and a value of zero othervise. Xfh  and 
           and Mfh denote exports from country f to country h, and imports of country f from country 
           h, respectively. 
Source: Görg and Geishecker (2005).      
 
The parameter values used for our simulation here are taken from the estimates by 
Geishecker and Görg  (2005) , which are based on a large sample of 60 countries with 6,819 
bilateral observations (see Table A5). The aggregate GDP of both countries has thus a string 
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impact on FDI. The coefficient for the endowment differences has a negative sign indicating 
the dominance of horizontal FDI. However, this does not necessarily imply that migration 
and FDI are complements: Since the outflow of labour reduces the aggregate GDP in the 
sending countries and, hence, increases the dissimilarities between the economies, it may 
also increase capital flows. Indeed, we find in our case that migration substitutes foreign 
investment weakly. Finally, the coefficient for interaction dummy of the rich country with 
the endowment difference has a positive sign, implying that capital will flow from the rich 
to the poor country. Note that the results of this study are similar to those of  Carr et al. 
(2001) and Blonigen et al. (2003), although the latter models consider also other 
specifications and use different variables (e.g. skill variables for factor endowments). 